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**FISCAL YEAR 2015 OVERSEAS
CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
BUDGET REQUEST**

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

HEARING HELD
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[There were no Documents submitted.]

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[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

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FISCAL YEAR 2015 OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS BUDGET REQUEST

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, July 16, 2014.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:19 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. "Buck" McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. "BUCK" MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COM- MITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to welcome our witnesses to today's hearing on the Department of Defense's Fiscal Year 2015 Overseas Contingency Operations Budget Request. We appreciate your flexibility this morning, as we dispense with other legislative matters.

Joining us today are Mr. Bob Work, Deputy Secretary of Defense; Admiral Sandy Winnefeld, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Mr. Michael McCord, Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller. This is the first time Mr. Work and Mr. McCord are appearing before the full committee in their new positions.

Welcome. Happy to have you here. And I congratulate you both and look forward to working with you in these new assignments.

Admiral, you have been here many times. Thanks again for being here with us.

However, today, you have an unenviable task of explaining a late OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations] request that has little detail and contains new funds and authorities that Congress heard about for the first time in the press, rather than from the Department, an occurrence that has become all too frequent.

Although the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] has passed the House, we will continue to work with the other committees of jurisdiction to review the \$58.6 billion OCO request and provide detail authorizations as we go to conference.

I am deeply concerned by the emerging narrative that, based on the projection of significantly fewer troops deployed to Afghanistan in 2015, the OCO request should automatically have a proportionate reduction.

U.S. contingency operations do not end with Afghanistan. As recent headlines show, U.S. forces in theater support a broad range of operations outside of Afghanistan, from the broader Middle East to the Horn of Africa and the Philippines, as well as other places around the world.

A decade of war has taken its toll on our forces. We have a moral obligation to our troops to reset the force and to restore readiness.

Frankly, I am concerned that future OCO requests will not rectify the reset liabilities that currently exist.

While we continue to migrate enduring requirements from OCO to the base budget, we understand that sequestration continues to be a burden on the Department. The only way to relieve this burden is to eliminate the discretionary budget caps imposed on the military.

Lastly, while my focus today is on the broader OCO request, I would also comment that the President has set up the \$5 billion counterterrorism and European funds for failure. We understand that these initiatives were levied on the Department by the White House without coordination, and you are now working to develop spending plans. But while counterterrorism partnerships and reassuring our European allies are important and necessary, the President's approach lacks detail and is too broad in scope.

I look forward to hearing your testimony today on these important matters.

Mr. Smith.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 45.]

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do welcome our witnesses. I appreciate your work and look forward to your testimony on this subject matter.

The purpose of the Overseas Contingency Operation from when it was first set up—the funds were to fund the efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. And this fund, at least in part, will do that in Afghanistan. There are still troops there. Our commitment to Afghanistan is going to last beyond the end of 2014.

There are train and equip aspects of it. And in addition to the fact that we will have, if the bilateral security agreement ever gets signed in Afghanistan, residual forces there—as well we should. There is a terrorism threat from that region. We all remember 9/11, that ungarded territory in Afghanistan gave Al Qaeda safe haven to plot and plan. They are still there. The Taliban is still there. There are groups we need to be worried about. So, that portion of the funding makes a great deal of sense. We are going to need to continue to go forward there in some capacity. So, we will see where that comes out.

Personally, I support the drawdown. I think the fewer troops we have there, the better, going forward for a variety of different reasons. But we will have a commitment there.

Second, in this OCO request are some of the new authorities that the chairman outlined for a Combating Terrorism Partnership Fund and a European Reassurance Initiative. Both of those may make sense. I think I speak for the entire committee when saying we need to know more about what they mean, or what is going to be contained in them.

Contained in one of those funds is an authorization for a Department of Defense [DOD] effort to support friendly rebels in Syria. Now, this is an effort that personally, I support. I understand the

limitations of it, but the bottom line is, when you look at ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] and what is going on in Syria and Iraq, regardless of the outcome, we are going to need friends in that region.

We have got an ugly situation between Assad, Iran, Hezbollah, and various Al Qaeda affiliates, or worse, in the case of ISIL. But the Free Syria movement that really started the idea that Assad needed to be replaced is primarily made up of people who are not sectarian. They simply want a better government and a better life for themselves. We can identify some of those people. We have identified some of those people, and we need to support them, because they are in a very, very hostile neighborhood. Still, on that piece, we would also like greater specifics.

And then we get to the real big issue, which the chairman mentioned. And that is that a substantial portion of this OCO request really is not directly related to the war in Afghanistan. It has been spread out amongst a variety of different other funds. And I understand why we are doing that. It has been a difficult 4 years, frankly, for the entire discretionary budget, not just for the Department of Defense, as we have gone through government shutdowns, threatened government shutdowns, sequestration, and a variety of other things that have made planning and funding anything, certainly at the Department of Defense, complicated and difficult, and has really put us in a deep hole. And I share the chairman's sentiment.

I don't support sequestration. I would expand upon that to say I don't just oppose sequestration for the Department of Defense, but for all other discretionary spending, as well. And there are a fair number of discretionary programs. You know, infrastructure, energy, health care, education—on and on—that have also faced the uncertainty and devastating cuts of the last 4 years. Sequestration doesn't make any sense. However, none of those other areas of our budget have an OCO. They don't have a place to go to backfill.

I don't necessarily oppose the idea that the Department of Defense does, but greater specificity as to the justification for that spending is something the committee and Congress is going to need to hear. All of which would not be an issue if we could get rid of sequestration and pass appropriations bills in a timely manner. You know, whatever the number is, at least give some predictability and dependency to the money we are going to spend. Congress hasn't done that, and that has created no end of problems. And I realize that the OCO is trying to respond to that situation, but we would like to hear a greater explanation for how those funds are going to be spent, and why.

With that, I yield back. I look forward to the testimony.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 46.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Before we hear from the witnesses—begin the business of the committee, I want to make clear that members of the audience must maintain order and refrain from manifestations of approval or disapproval of the committee proceedings, or interfere with the

conduct of the committee's business. Any comments or disruptions during the hearing from the public will not be tolerated, and, if necessary, will result in removal from the committee room. I want to state this at the outset so that everybody knows the rules.

Mr. Secretary.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT O. WORK, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; ADM JAMES A. "SANDY" WINNEFELD, JR., USN, VICE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; AND HON. MICHAEL J. MCCORD, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT O. WORK

Secretary WORK. Mr. Chairman, I have a longer written statement that I would like to insert in the record, but I would like your permission to just give a very brief overview.

The CHAIRMAN. Each of the witnesses' complete written testimonies will be included in the record without objection, so ordered.

Secretary WORK. Thank you, sir.

Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, members of the committee, we very much appreciate the opportunity to be here this morning. On behalf of Secretary Hagel, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey, and the men and women in uniform that we all serve, we want to thank this committee especially for your continued support to our troops, who every day are conducting operations on behalf of our Nation's security in what is becoming a very volatile, complex, and dangerous world.

It is with those ongoing operations in mind that I would like to address DOD's fiscal year 2015 Overseas Contingency Operations request. As you know, it is \$58.6 billion, which the President recently submitted to Congress.

This request is about \$27 billion—\$26.7 exactly—or about one-third less than the \$85.3 billion enacted by Congress for OCO last year. It is \$100 billion less than the \$159 billion that was enacted just 4 years ago.

It reflects a continued downward trajectory of our war-related spending as we conclude our combat mission in Afghanistan after 13 years of war. However, even as the war ends—and this was one of the points that the chairman made—we will continue to seek OCO to cover the costs of returning, repairing, and replacing equipment until that process is complete—the costs associated with our broader presence in the Middle East, from which we support a number of critical missions in the region, as well as unforeseen contingencies.

The requested funds for 2015 would provide \$53.4 billion for Operation Enduring Freedom [OEF]. This funding will support the responsible drawdown of forces in Afghanistan, as announced by the President. It will provide continued support and assistance for the Afghan National Security Forces and our coalition partners. It will pay for the retrograde of equipment and personnel and the continuing reset of forces. And it will enable a really vast range of support activities in theater, including logistics and intelligence. And it will support a portion of the temporary Army and Marine Corps

end strength that supports OEF as approved by this committee, which we very much thank you for.

The 2015 OCO request also supports the two Presidential initiatives the chairman and the ranking member referred to—\$5 billion for the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund, of which DOD would receive \$4 billion, and \$1 billion for the European Reassurance Initiative, which DOD would receive \$925 million. Before I briefly touch on these two initiatives, I would just like to talk about three important points of the OCO submission writ large.

The costs in Afghanistan and the greater Middle East region remain substantial. Even with the end of our combat role in Afghanistan, we will continue to provide continuing support for our troops and carry out our ongoing counterterrorism mission there, which I am sure everyone here will agree, is not getting any easier. This will require high-end intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, close-air support, force protection, and logistics into next year. We also must return thousands of pieces of equipment from Afghanistan to our home stations and close down hundreds of combat facilities there. That is a process that is ongoing and that I talked with the people in my recent trip to Afghanistan. It also supports other important missions, as approved by this committee and the other committees in Congress, outside of Afghanistan, including the Middle East [and] Horn of Africa.

Secondly, this request will continue to help our military recover and reset from more than a decade of fighting. It is going to be used to repair and replace damaged or worn-out equipment after prolonged use. And when units return from combat, as is our intent, and this Congress—I mean, this committee—has supported, restoring them to a condition that allows them to conduct training exercises, achieve their readiness levels, and prepare for future deployments. The need for this equipment reset will continue beyond 2015.

Third and finally, this request provides continued support and assistance to our partners, the Afghan National Security Force. Over the last year, these forces have demonstrated tactical superiority over the Taliban and they have prevented the Taliban from gaining momentum, as demonstrated by their professionalism in the most recent national elections.

We believe it is critically important that we maintain sufficient financial support for these forces, so they can sustain these gains and continue to assume full responsibility across Afghanistan.

I will just quickly touch on the two new initiatives. I know there are a lot of questions about them. The CTPF, the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund, this \$5 billion includes \$4 billion, as I said, for the Department of Defense. And the overall goal is, one, to increase the ability of our partner countries in the region to conduct counterterrorism operations and, two, prevent the proliferation of terrorist threats from neighboring states. And three, participate in multinational counterterrorism operations, including countering ISIL and other terrorist groups in the region.

About \$2.5 billion of that is for counterterrorism support, and \$1 billion for a Syria Regional Stabilization Initiative, which will help Syria's neighbors including Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey confront the threats there. As part of this initiative, we are seeking

\$500 million to train and equip vetted elements of the moderate Syrian armed opposition, and an additional \$500 million would be for crisis response for U.S. forces.

The second initiative, the ERI, the European Reassurance Initiative, was announced on June 3rd in the President's speech in Warsaw. It proposed increases in the U.S. military deployments in Europe after the developments in Eastern Europe and in Ukraine, in particular.

We believe that a more temporary increase in rotational U.S. air, land, and sea presence in Europe, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, along with more extensive bilateral and multilateral exercises and trainings are necessary and appropriate demonstrations of support to our NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies and partners who are deeply concerned by Russia's occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea and other provocative actions in Ukraine.

So to summarize, the funds we are requesting will support our troops who are already serving in harm's way in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the Central Command area of responsibility. They will support the President's decision to maintain U.S. presence in Afghanistan. They will fund these two initiatives that are needed to further our national security objectives, both in counterterrorism and Europe, and we ask for your support for these requests.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. And we look forward to answering your questions.

[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Work and Admiral Winnefeld can be found in the Appendix on page 48.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. No further opening statements. Thank you.

As I stated in my opening remarks, there is a narrative that, based on the lower number of troops deployed in Afghanistan in 2015 after we have finished the drawdown, the OCO request should only be \$20 billion in fiscal year 2015. This obviously doesn't take into account operations and enduring activities outside of Afghanistan, as well as resetting the forces' equipment returns from theater.

Can you discuss the activities and force structure outside of Afghanistan that the OCO request supports and how these funds directly or indirectly correlate to the number of boots on the ground in Afghanistan?

Secretary WORK. Yes, sir. Operations directly related in Afghanistan in the force protection operations there have come down from 28—or \$26.2 billion in 2013 enacted and have fallen all the way to \$11 billion. So we are actually seeing in Afghanistan, as troops levels come down, a very substantial reduction.

But you know, over that same time, the amount of money that is dedicated to in-theater support in Central Command area of responsibility, which the relevant committees in Congress have been very helpful. That is \$18 billion. The remainder of the money is all really indirectly in support of Afghanistan. For example, the Joint IED [improvised explosive device] Defeat [Organization]. That is very heavily focused on Afghanistan, as well as other partners. The extra money includes reset. The extra money includes the two new funds that the President has asked for. It includes the Army and

the Marine Corps temporary end strength. It includes classified support.

So if someone just looks at the boots on the ground, I think they are missing the forest for the trees. The actual money that is supporting the operation's force protection in Afghanistan itself is coming down. But the indirect support for those forces as well the other forces in the Central Command area of operations are still doing very, very important work and that is what is really part of the whole \$57 billion. I would ask Admiral Winnefeld if he has—

Admiral WINNEFELD. And I think the fact that it is \$26 billion less than it was this current year is very indicative of the fact of the drawdown in Afghanistan. But just because something isn't in Afghanistan doesn't mean that it is enduring. And I would echo Deputy Secretary Work's statements about—there is an awful lot in this request that is outside Afghanistan, but that supports Afghanistan or is an integral part of our operations in Afghanistan.

But I would also like to make the point that as sequester has impacted the Department, it has really squeezed our ability to absorb within the Department unanticipated operations. I will just use a couple of examples. The Tomodachi earthquake in Japan. We absorbed all of the expenses for that that were not what we would normally be spending for deployed ships and the like elsewhere in the Department.

We have a lot less capability to do that now than we did before. So the \$500 million which is part of the CTPF request is going to help us do things like that. Another example, we have a Patriot battery in Turkey that we put in last year, because of the crisis in Syria. The Army is taking that out of hide right now. And as you know, the Army is not in a position to take an awful lot of stuff out of hide.

So I think it is a reasonable request in here, in terms of \$20 billion less than last year—fully supports the operations in Afghanistan, including how they are supported from outside Afghanistan, and also it starts to build just a little bit of room for us to be able to manage unanticipated contingencies that can arise anywhere in the world. And we really would appreciate congressional support for that idea and for the small amount of funding we are asking this year for that.

The CHAIRMAN. Readiness, specifically, with respect to the services' core mission has been affected by over a decade of war. For example, young Marines have not trained in core amphibious missions. They are becoming Army. And the Air Force cannot meet its readiness needs until 2023. Given the current pressures on the base budget, did the Department consider addressing non-reset and sustainment readiness shortfalls in the budget amendment?

Admiral WINNEFELD. Mr. Chairman, in trying to stay true and faithful to what the concept of overseas contingency operations really means, we didn't view that kind of training necessarily as falling into that category. It would be tempting to do that. We would love to do that. But we really wanted to stay faithful and really reset this OCO idea into what it is really supposed to be.

But what we would really like to get is support from the Congress for the readiness accounts that we have, so that we can train all of the services into that full spectrum of operations that you so

correctly refer to. And I think that the overall budget submission the Department has made will help us do that. The more we lose in things like compensation savings, and the like, we are going to squeeze that even more.

Secretary WORK. Just to follow on, Mr. Chairman, I couldn't agree more with the vice chairman's comments.

If you took the money that was outside—if you just said, “Okay, we are only going to fund the forces and the force protection operations in Afghanistan, and that is it,” the rest of that money would have to be absorbed in the base budget. And as the vice chairman said, it would most likely come out of primarily readiness. And we are ready. As the chairmen of the Joint Chiefs had told this committee and others, the readiness problem is the thing that worries us the most every day. This is not something that we are making up. This is something that we actually spend most of our time thinking about—how do we get out of this readiness trough over the next couple years?

So, I completely echo what the vice chairman said. If we had to absorb a large portion of this in 1 year, we would in essence have two sequestration hits in 1 year. It would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to absorb that type of a cut.

The CHAIRMAN. You know, my concern isn't that the number is too high. My concern is it is too low—both this and the base budget, but we have talked about that many times.

Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just to sort of drill down this point—in terms of what the OCO is for. Is it your contention that the full \$58.6 billion—well, first of all, for overseas contingency operations—I guess, how would you define those? I mean, we think of it in a fairly straightforward way in terms of the cost of being in Afghanistan.

Now, Admiral, you mentioned some other issues. But if, in fact, the OCO is meant to be broader than that, that is okay. But I think we need some parameters on what “broader than that” means. So, is there any way you can break it down and say, okay, \$58.6 billion—you know, \$20 billion of it or whatever is for what is going on in Afghanistan. You know, another \$10 billion is for the readiness gaps that have been created by what is going on in Afghanistan, and even, I guess, probably still absorbing what happened with Iraq. And then we have got other portions for, as you mentioned, Admiral, some of those unforeseen things.

I think, that is one of the things that has been sort of vexing for Congress about the OCO presentation here, is it has been sort of a “hide the ball” thing. We don't know why. I mean, there may be justifications, but it has not been clearly explained beyond, as I said—the average Member of Congress—okay, OCO—we are in Afghanistan. We get that. But what else? Is there any way you could refine your point on that?

Admiral WINNEFELD. Sir, before I defer to the deputy secretary and to Mr. McCord—the way we would tend to define what ought to be in an OCO-like appropriation would be anything that we do while we are deployed, or that supports our deployments that is over and above what we would normally do in a tabula rasa peaceful world—

Mr. SMITH. Right.

Admiral WINNEFELD [continuing]. Where we are just maintaining a deterrent presence. And I hate to do math in public, but I would say, you know, about \$53 billion of this is directly supporting something that we wouldn't ordinarily be doing, and that is an Afghanistan contingency.

And there are other things in there—the President's initiatives on the CTPF and the ERI that are things that we wouldn't ordinarily be doing in a normal world, either.

I will give you an example of what I mean by this.

An ordinary aircraft carrier with its carrier air wing that is deployed to the Arabian Gulf for a deterrent presence—none of the flying hours that that carrier flies that it would normally fly on a normal deployment are charged to OCO. Anything it flies above and beyond that to support a contingency in Afghanistan, or even flying missions over Iraq, as we are now, we would tend to charge to OCO because that is something we didn't anticipate doing.

In a way, you can look at it as actually being more efficient with the defense budget, rather than having a large budget that you, you know, try to find the slop in, if you can find it in order—you know, rob Peter to pay Paul—you would now have a fund that you can use, particularly with the CTPF and the \$500 million I just mentioned.

Mr. SMITH. Right.

Admiral WINNEFELD. But you only spend strictly controlled if it is something over and above what you would ordinarily do.

Mr. SMITH. I understand that. I mean, one could make the argument that—I mean, there is always going to be something unanticipated in the defense world. And you try to budget within the parameters of that, and not have a separate fund in case something comes up.

And, again, most of the other budgets—they have things that come up and surprise them, as well. Department of Homeland Security is experiencing that right now. But we have done this with disaster relief and on and on. But, of course, we do occasionally send up supplementals for all of those things. In fact, one has been requested for the Department of Homeland Security. So, I think that does make sense.

Secretary WORK. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Secretary.

Secretary WORK. Just to follow on—again, for those who just count the troops in Afghanistan and say, "Holy moly. The—"

Mr. SMITH. Right.

Secretary WORK. "OCO isn't coming down"—it is an entirely erroneous argument. If you take a look at the amount of money that is specifically just for operations of the forces and the force protection, then you see that downward slope from, as I said, \$26 billion in 2013 to only \$11 billion in this one. But as the vice chairman has said, over time, we have rules that we actually have to follow with OMB [Office of Management and Budget] that have developed with our interaction with Congress and OMB.

Everything that is in this request, we can explain based on past practices. It includes the Joint IED Defeat [Organization]. It includes the Office of Security Cooperation of Iraq. It includes all the

reset money. It includes a temporary end strength. All of these things are indirectly in support of those service men and women who are in Afghanistan.

And then the other portion of it, specifically to your question, is—about 2 years ago, we started to debate on whether or not to include these outside Afghanistan and in-theater costs. And for the last 2 years, they have been part of the OCO budget and are in this year. And that is another \$18 billion, so—

Mr. SMITH. And I get all that. Let me just note that it would be more helpful for all of us concerned if all of that calculating was done sooner, so that we—you know, I mean, we marked up our bill in May. We went through all of that. I mean, May is a good 6, 7 months into the fiscal year. It seems like we ought to be able to get that to us somewhere around the same time that we get the general budget request. And that should happen.

One final area of questioning. The problem with these two funds—and I—you know, I certainly support the idea of the, you know, the counterterrorism fund. I think, you know, in building partnerships with our friends in Europe and all that. But as we look at them, they appear fairly open and open-ended in terms of, you know, what you could conceivably spend the money on.

Where in the OCO request are there any restrictions on those two funds on what the DOD could decide to do with the money?

Secretary WORK. Well, sir, I think this is an interactive discussion that we are looking forward to. On one side is, have a fully cooked plan that we can say, “This is exactly how we expect to spend the money,” and then debate the merits of the plan.

Mr. SMITH. Yes.

Secretary WORK. And the other one, which is what we have tried to do, is, we see what is happening in the greater Middle East and the Central Command area of responsibility and Europe. We know that we already have plenty of authorities, which the Congress has given us—1206, 1208, 1207, Global Sustain and Lift. And rather than saying, “We think we will put money on all of those bins that have caps,” it would be better for us to agree on the types of things that we would be able to do, and then work with the oversight level that the Congress is comfortable with.

So, it is these two poles. I know that on one side, it is a fully cooked plan. The other one is to have a more flexible plan, which is what we are arguing for. But we are actually looking forward to the discussion with the committees and Congress on how best to do this. Because we see what is happening in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, throughout the greater region. Flexibility is something we really need now, based on the very, very difficult time we have in our overall budget.

Admiral WINNEFELD. And I would just add briefly, we have the 15-day notification requirement that we will have to submit to the Congress. And I know that there is a waiver in there. But if you go to that well too often, you are going to end up losing in the end. And we do really look forward to working with the Congress on this.

Mr. SMITH. I am not sure arguing right now about notifications requirements is the best approach with this committee, but I do appreciate that it is there.

So, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Thornberry.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Secretary Work, welcome. I think on that last point, however, you have been given kind of a difficult assignment for your first job here in front of this committee on these new authorities. And I am sympathetic with having a discussion on how we can improve the authorities that exist to deal with the real world.

Our subcommittee has a number of hearings on 1206, 1208—what is happening with that money, what sort of circumstances are we confronting around the world, and how do existing authorities tie our hands for dealing with them?

I just don't think coming up—the President giving a speech at the end of May and then coming up a few weeks later saying, “Give me \$5 billion for me to spend” is a very good way to have a conversation about having these authorities. And so, let me see if I understand a couple things.

One is that this new authority on counterterrorism does not replace 1206, 1208, or the Global Security Fund. It is kind of a piggy bank over here that then you could move funds from the new authority into those other funds. Is that right?

Secretary WORK. Yes, sir. That is essentially correct. It is a transfer fund which would utilize the existing authorities so it would give us permission to go over the caps that you have already established in those particular authorities after notifying Congress and describing what we would do.

We are only asking for one new authority and that has to do with the Syrian initiative. But we can't go too much into that in an open hearing.

Mr. THORNBERRY. No, I understand.

It just seems to me, for example, this year in its regular budget request, the administration asked for an increase in some of the caps. So we ought to have that conversation. As I say, we just had a hearing last week going on where that money is spent and why we are bumping up against the cap. But to have another fund out here that can just get around the caps, to me, may not be the most helpful approach moving forward.

Let me just ask one question on the Syria thing because it looks like half of the money goes to neighbors. And I notice in your written statement, some of that is for humanitarian purposes. Is that money that DOD would spend? Is it giving to Jordan, et cetera. Explain to me the humanitarian aspects of DOD OCO funds for Syria's neighbors.

Secretary WORK. I think I might be mixing apples and oranges here, sir. There is \$500 million for us to improve the partnership of the surrounding countries around Syria, so that would be Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq. Then there is \$500 million to assist appropriately vetted Syrian opposition groups. And then there is another \$500 million that State has—or excuse me—\$500 million that State has that—and I believe—and I will ask Mr. McCord to make sure I am not getting this wrong, that I think most of the humanitarian assistance would be coming from the State aspect of it.

Secretary McCORD. Yes, if you think about the humanitarian crisis that there is of all the displaced people, that is not something the Department is planning on handling with our part. And I think, in fact, State would mainly do that with some of their existing funds. We would be much more focused on the border issue, the border security with Jordan, things like that, than dealing with the—we are not intending to go into the refugee camps and provide assistance with our fund.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Right. Well, that is what I wanted to make sure I understood. Let me just ask briefly about the European Reassurance Initiative. I guess my first question is about the name. We are part of a NATO treaty alliance where we are pledged to defend each other when attacked. So why does Europe need to be reassured with money?

Secretary WORK. Sir, this would be—well, first of all, I just came back from the United Kingdom, and I spoke with the senior leaders and they said, 6 months ago, they were trying to figure out what the NATO Summit would be really discussing. And now President Putin has given them very much focus.

All of the governments in NATO and the European Union are trying to determine, you know, how to respond. And this is something that the United States has always done to reassure our NATO allies that we would be with them. And all of this money would go into allowing us to have more frequent forward deployments, more frequent exercises. We would be able to do improved infrastructure that would allow rapid reinforcement, if that became necessary.

So this is just another commitment to NATO that this—we understand, you know, you have shifted your attention to Asia. This is just another way to reassure our allies and NATO that we are a global power. We have global responsibilities and we would want them to know that we are there with them.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, not my thought. For what it is worth is they need to be reassured, perhaps of U.S. leadership and U.S. commitment. I am not sure that having another fund really accomplishes that. But I yield back. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you to all of you, Secretary Work, Admiral, and Mr. Secretary McCord as well. I know it is a little difficult to speak in terms of a great deal of detail. And I understand the way you need to bracket that. But I also wonder if you could go into some detail than you have given us about the \$140 million for the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq and more background about how that is going to be spent and how the additional U.S. forces in Iraq would be funded? I understand this is not boots on the ground, but we still have to fund. And what other potential courses of action in Iraq, how would that be funded?

Secretary WORK. Ma'am, the OCO budget does not include any money that would cover the operations and the things that we have been doing most recently in Iraq, as far as the assessments, et cetera. The Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq [OSCI] has been there since we have left. They handle all the FMF [foreign military

financing] cases. They are responsible for bringing the F-16s into service as well as all of the other ones. This has been a long-standing program.

And the Office for Security Cooperation-Iraq, obviously, a lot will determine on what the outcome is on the government formation in Iraq. But right now, nothing in the OCO covers any of the other aspects we are doing with the possible exception of the \$500 million we have asked for crisis support operations, which goes right back to what the vice chairman was saying. These were unexpected events. It would be very difficult to take out of hide.

Admiral WINNEFELD. The deputy is exactly correct, on the \$140 million for OSCI Iraq. Those are the people who are trying to help the Iraqis at the ministerial and high levels, you know, maintain their military. The current things that we are doing in Iraq we wouldn't use OCO for that because those are coming out of forces that are already in theater. We didn't deploy any extra forces to the theater to do this. I would say, and obviously it is this fiscal year, it is not the fiscal year we are asking for this appropriation. But in a future year, for example, we had to take some contingency action in Iraq. If the President were to choose to do that, then this is the kind of—the \$500-million piece of this which is relatively small, compared to the amount of contingency money we have spent in other places, but it is a start. That is what we would tap into to fund and recover from some of those operations. And a related example would be if we had taken kinetic action in Syria last year, then this is the first place we would turn. That small \$500 million fund.

Mrs. DAVIS. Are you suggesting then that if there are additional dollars for Iraq, the 15-day notification would kick in?

Admiral WINNEFELD. We would, yes, we would. If we were to do that, we would give you the 15-day notification. Now if it were an emergency, as we have done in the past with Congress, we will—you know, we will call and say, hey, we don't have 15 days here, are you okay with this. And we have had a pretty good cooperative relationship, I think, with Congress when that has come into play.

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay. Great. I know that the—a question was asked about the Syria Regional Stabilization Initiative, but I think it is still an issue of why that requirement is part of the undefined transfer fund. And not a direct request of Congress to provide assistance. Can you clarify that again?

Secretary WORK. As part of the broader counterterrorism partnership strategy that the President outlined, obviously, everything that is happening right now in Syria and Iraq has been the focus of intense discussion and debate with inside the administration. And I think the President felt that we know we are going to be doing something. We are not certain what it is. And what we tried to do is peg to certain levels of effort. So for example, the \$500 million that we had for our partners, we just said, what would happen if we had to do something to assist one of the countries. And we just kind of built it out from there to give examples to the committee and Congress on this is type of things that we are anticipating. But it is impossible for us to predict exactly right now what it might be.

Admiral WINNEFELD. You know, the other thing I would append to that, if I might, is you know Russia's illegal seizure of Crimea occurred after our budget submission. And so, you know, we didn't intend to submit a new budget because of that. This is a good vehicle for us to approach the Congress and request money to do the things we think we need to do in Europe to reassure our allies.

Mrs. DAVIS. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Jones.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

And Mr. Work, I just want to read you three headlines, and then I want to get to a question. "Is the Pentagon Wasting Taxpayers' Money in Afghanistan?" "The United States 'Military Was No Match for Afghan's Corruption," subtitled "the Pentagon wasn't just defeated by the country's graft—the Pentagon made it worse." And then another title, "Money Pit: the Monstrous Failure of U.S. Aid to Afghanistan."

I represent the 3rd District of North Carolina, which is the home of Camp Lejeune Marine Base and Cherry Point Marine Air Station.

Four weeks ago, I went to Walter Reed Hospital. There were two Marines from my district who had been severely wounded.

In visiting the rehabilitation area, I met three Army soldiers from Fort Bragg, which is not in my district, who had lost one leg each.

Then the young Marine that I went to see—I saw he and his father—the young Marine had lost two legs and one arm; 23 years of age. The father had the saddest eyes I have ever seen as we were talking about his son's future.

The second Marine from Camp Lejeune February this year stepped on a 40-pound IED, lost both legs.

I look at the absolute waste of life first and money second and here you are asking for money. I understand that.

But the American taxpayer is absolutely frustrated and broke because of these overseas activities. I do not understand why you can sit here today and ask for this money with such waste, fraud, and abuse going on in Afghanistan.

A few of us on this committee have met separately with John Sopko, the Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction. And we met in a bipartisan way at an 8 o'clock breakfast that we put together ourselves.

And to hear his explaining of absolute ridiculous waste of the taxpayers' money, and then I look at these Marines and these Army guys that I saw just a few weeks ago—I don't know how in good conscience the administration or the Defense Department can come here and ask for additional money when you can't even account for 70 percent of it that is going over there.

It is an absolute waste and I do not understand on behalf of the taxpayers and those in the military when we sit here at many hearings and we talk about we need more money to maintain platforms, to build new platforms, to rebuild our military that has worn out, where in the world did we not get to a point that we say enough is enough?

The Afghan's parliament had the right to vote on a 10-year bilateral security agreement, and we in Congress have not had that opportunity. I don't blame the President for that; I blame ourselves, quite frankly.

But the frustration of the American people is getting deeper and deeper and deeper. And I don't know why you need this money; it is nothing but a slush fund, anyway.

And we got no more business going into Syria than I do walking from here to China; it makes no sense at all.

I would like just to hear your comments about accountability because I know you are new on the job. But you need to get John Sopko in your office, one-on-one, and get John Sopko in front of the President of the United States and just hear how the American taxpayer is being abused.

Yes, sir; please.

Secretary WORK. Well, sir, I am a Marine. I finished Active Duty in 2001. I visited the very same service men and women who are on the ward in Walter Reed. In fact, I think I went just last week.

I think if you asked any of them if their—

Mr. JONES. [Off mike.]

Secretary WORK. Well, I just wanted to say, sir—

Mr. JONES. Sir, I wanted to know about the waste, fraud, and abuse that is taking place every day and what is the Department of Defense trying to do about it? That is all I want to know.

Secretary WORK. All right, sir. I will get right to it. I think each of them would say that they felt that their sacrifices were for something worthwhile.

I just visited General Dunford in Afghanistan. His discretion—

Mr. JONES. You are not answering—my time is almost up.

Secretary WORK. All right.

Mr. JONES. You cannot explain the waste, fraud, and abuse and that is what is wrong with your request, quite frankly. Thank you.

Secretary WORK. Sir, I would say that we can explain—the IG [Inspector General] is doing a very valuable function in pointing out to areas where we could have done better, but we believe that the money that we are requesting is for a worthwhile endeavor.

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Langevin.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I want to thank you for your testimony here today. I am still trying to make sense of all this. Some of it has been answered, but there are still some contradictory or unclear purposes for the fund.

Let me ask this: What percentage of the request is for making up for base budget shortfalls and are OCO funds being used for UFRs [unfunded requirements]?

Secretary WORK. I didn't hear the last part of the question, sir.

Mr. LANGEVIN. I said are OCO funds being used for unfunded requirements? So, I said they—what percentage of the request is making up for base budget shortfalls and the second question is are OCO funds being used for unfunded requirements?

Secretary MCCORD. Congressman, we would say none of it is used for base budget shortfalls. Per se, our base budget as was noted by the ranking member was well—you know, submitted well

before this one was. So, we didn't have anything that was being saved for an OCO request that was undetermined.

The OCO request was waiting on the enduring presence issue mainly. We did not—the OCO request has no correlation with the service chiefs' unfunded requirements list. That is not what it—again, not what it was built for.

There are things, and the deputy secretary alluded to the temporary end strength, that would be very difficult for us to do without the OCO, but it is not the case that we are—that we view this as just extra base budget money.

Secretary WORK. A different way to answer, sir, is that if we had to absorb this into our base budget, it would make already a difficult problem for us impossible.

Admiral WINNEFELD. And I would add that there are things we rejected that could have been in this request that would have done exactly what you are suggesting, and that would be substituting, you know, basically an unfunded requirement slipping in here and we rejected that during this process.

Mr. LANGEVIN. So, is the fund to be used solely to support foreign forces, entities, et cetera, assisting U.S. forces, as indicated in budget justification materials and that the name implies? Or is the fund going to be used to fund U.S.-only efforts and operations?

Secretary WORK. Are you speaking of the OCO writ large, sir, or one of the two funds that we just—

Mr. LANGEVIN. One of the two funds.

Secretary WORK. The two funds—there is money in there for U.S. forces. As the vice chairman said, there is \$500 million to support our contingency response operations. There is money in there to support ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] enablers that we might purchase in support of our partners; that might be a Predator orbit, for example.

So, there are things that would support our forces in those funds. But a very good portion of it is to support our partners.

Mr. LANGEVIN. And, so then, my next question is what is your understanding of the interagency policy process by which the National Security Council will solicit information on requirements for funding from this account, allocate funding in, and how will the money actually be executed?

Secretary WORK. It was developed through a very robust interagency process involving Department of State, OMB, Department of Defense, our other government agency partners.

We anticipate what would happen is the National Security Council and OMB—we would go to them, explain what we want to do; they would then give their approval. Then we would come to Congress with 15-day notification and wait and go from there.

So, we do anticipate an interagency process here, with the exception of emergent things, as the vice chairman has said.

Admiral WINNEFELD. And I would just add, as an example, the \$500 million that we would anticipate for training and equipping Syrian opposition forces—that is going to be subject to a very, very intense and rigorous interagency process through the deputies and the principals, ultimately the President, and then of course we would consult with Congress with the 15-day requirement.

Mr. LANGEVIN. And so, then my next question—Mr. Secretary, could you expound upon the plans for the \$140 million requested for the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq and what courses of action require additional funding requests to Congress and what actions would cause the Department to notify Congress or congressional notification to undertake additional military intervention?

Secretary WORK. Mr. McCord might have some more specifics. But as we discussed, sir, the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq has been there since we left in 2011.

They do all of the FMF cases. So, right now, they are the ones who are handling the transfer of Hellfire missiles; they are the ones who were working on the F-16s that the Iraqis have purchased; they would be the ones that would handle the other things, just like another Office of Security Cooperation in many of our countries around the world. But I don't have any more specifics on that.

Secretary MCCORD. I would just add that the OSCI request is the same request that we had last year and the year before, as the deputy said, that the committees have approved in the authorizing and appropriation language, have given us the particular authorities that vest in the OSCI, whether it is for transportation or logistics.

So there is nothing new in the OSCI. What is the new situation in Iraq, as the vice chairman said, with respect to the advisers, with respect to what is going on with ISIL, is not encapsulated in any specific proposal in this request.

That would, as the vice chairman said, have to come out of the Crisis Response Fund, or out of other OCO funds. But this request was not—the OSCI is in no way meant as a proxy for a new Iraq operation. It is just the same OSCI that we have been describing that we have had for a couple of years.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Forbes.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Admiral, Mr. Secretary, Mr. Secretary, thank you all for your service to our country, and for being here. And Secretary Work, congratulations on your confirmation, and we look forward to working with you on that.

One of the questions that I have is somewhat a follow-up on what Mr. Thornberry said regarding the European Reassurance Initiative. I supported the President when early on he made the decision that we should have a pivot to the Asia-Pacific area, and then supported the Secretary of Defense when he said we needed to have a pivot to the Asia-Pacific area.

Didn't disagree when they changed the name to "rebalance." That was okay. But my concern is if I look at that area, I still recognize we have got some of the largest militaries in the world located there. We have got some of the largest economies in the world located there, probably two-thirds of the world trade is going to come through there the next decade.

But then I question this: When the President went for his visit there, he goes on the backdrop of a budget that was going to essentially cut a carrier out of our fleet, a budget that would put up half of our cruiser fleet, a budget that would impact our Tomahawk missile production. We hear rumors of him trying to take out six destroyers in the next budget.

And then I look at this request, and we have a European Reassurance Initiative, where we say we have got to convince our allies in Europe that we are there for them. If you are an ally in the Asia-Pacific area, how do you read all of this? When you say we have got all these words talking about the shift, and the pivot, but then I see this backdrop that is taking away the capacity. And then second, I see this fund to Europe, but I don't see anything about the Asia-Pacific area to reassure our allies there.

Give me some comfort level for them that I can take back to them.

Secretary WORK. Sir, I believe our interactions with our allies in the Pacific are extensive and very fruitful. They see our base budget, and they see that 60 percent of a fleet, for example, is now in the Pacific theater. They see some of the other initiatives that we are going about.

And the ERI, I think the President was clear, and I think we have made clear, we consider the ERI more of a temporary nature. We don't see this one becoming more enduring. This was something that occurred. And our base budget is very, very, I think, focused on our allies in Asia, and working with both—I mean, the Australians, the South Koreans, the Japanese. I believe they would say that our interaction is very extensive.

Admiral WINNEFELD. Great question. I would say, first of all, if I were in the Pacific, and I observed the United States reacting to an illegal seizure of land by a large power, and that we are actually asking for money from the Congress to provide more reassurance, more actual building partnership capacity, more prepositioning in response to that, I might actually feel comforted that—

Mr. FORBES. And Admiral, I don't want to disagree, because I respect all of you so much. But they do see China at this particular point in time, with all their territorial claims moving, and that to them is just as disconcerting as what they see in Europe.

But let me give one more question. I don't want to cut you off, because I would love to hear you answer. But help me on the OCO funding, too. As I understand it, we have got about 11,000, plus or minus, troops that are going to be there next year for fiscal year in Afghanistan.

But the OCO funding also covers—we have got about 63,000 troops around the globe. Could you just give me a snapshot so people understand this OCO funding is not just about Afghanistan, the broad breadth of what it is trying to cover in addition to that?

Secretary WORK. Yes, sir. You are exactly right. The 11,000 is an average over 2015—excuse me, 11,000 over the course of the fiscal year as we draw down to 9,800, and then about half of that.

The 63,000 forces that are in the Central Command area of responsibility in the Horn of Africa are doing very, very important missions every day; deterrence of Iran, working against counterterrorism in the Horn of Africa.

So you are exactly right, sir, this covers 63,000 service men and women who are forward doing national security tasks every day.

Mr. FORBES. Gentlemen, thank you so much for your time. And, Admiral, I would love to talk to you a little bit further. But I didn't mean to cut you off, but I was just running out of time. So thank you. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Barber.

Mr. BARBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, gentlemen, for being here, and for your service.

I want to talk a little bit about how OCO supports functions here at home. As you know, the budget concludes critical funds that keep our warfighters safe, and provide the resources for critical missions at military installations across the world.

And actually in my district, Fort Huachuca in Sierra Vista, and Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Tucson, where I proudly represent the civilians, airmen, soldiers who serve a critical role for our Nation. And at Fort Huachuca, specifically, the Army intelligence, signal, and cyber operations, many of these members work at the Army's Intelligence Center of Excellence, NETCOM [Network Enterprise Technology Command], and the Army—9th Army Signal Command Headquarters. These men and women provide critical capabilities at OCONUS [outside the continental U.S.], operational requirements and contingency missions around the world. They also serve in capacities that are at the leading edge of technology in the forefront of cyber warfare, which is one of DOD's top priorities.

Many special missions, gentlemen, like the ones at Fort Huachuca, have requirements that blend their daily tasks at home with overseas contingency operations. So I would like to ask, what do you see as the dual impact of sequestration, and the decline of OCO funding, on our intelligence and cyber communities; particularly, the important missions that are provided to our Army at Fort Huachuca?

Admiral WINNEFELD. I don't know that I can address Fort Huachuca exclusively, although we can get some answers for you on the record for that. But I would say that in the base budget, one of the things that we have protected very carefully is our cyber force.

In fact, you know, we say flat is the new growth in our business. And in fact, the cyber force is growing. It is about the only place that is actually going to grow inside DOD over the coming years, based on the budget challenges we have had over time. So if that trickles down to Fort Huachuca, then—particularly on the cyber side, then there would be some benefit there, I would—

Mr. BARBER. Well, I certainly appreciate the plus-up in cyber is critical. I mean, clearly, the wars of today and tomorrow are going to be fought, in many ways, in that arena.

Let me ask Secretary Work a question about the bilateral security agreement [BSA], which we still hope will be signed as soon as the Afghanistan Presidential election is resolved. The question I have is, if it is not signed by fiscal year 2015, what impact would this have on the OCO budget, and what changes would have to be made, and how would resources have to be allocated differently?

Secretary WORK. It is a great question, sir. Well, first of all, a lot of people try you know, say, "Hey, isn't what is happening in Iraq going to replay in Afghanistan?"

And we say right now, absolutely not, because I have spoken to the people who tried to negotiate with Iraq on the status of forces agreement [SOFA], which would have allowed us to keep forces in

country. And they could not get their parliament to deliver. They asked us to leave. Period, end of story.

There are a lot of different views on how that happened, but that, I think, is the truth of the matter. Both of the Presidential candidates in Afghanistan have said they will sign the BSA.

Now, what is troubling to us is as this electoral crisis continues, there is going to come a point where we are going to have to make a decision. But right now, both of the candidates have said that is one of the first things they will address.

They want U.S. forces to stay in the country. They want to have a very close partnership, which goes back to why we do not think, in any way, shape or form, that the money we are asking for would be wasteful.

The other thing we have to—this also addresses NATO. NATO has a SOFA agreement that they need to sign. There is a NATO ministerial in September. If the electoral problem is not resolved by mid-September, that is where I think it would trigger a big debate internally with our NATO partners and with Congress.

So, to your exact point, if it falls apart and the BSA is not signed, the President said we will start a withdrawal. And of course, that would impact ultimate spending on the OCO funding.

Mr. BARBER. The clock is really ticking on this. Obviously, we now have a recount going on of all of the ballots. I mean, it could take weeks and weeks and then who knows what the end result will be, in terms of the dispute over the findings.

Is there a breaking point when we have to decide we are out of there because we don't have a BSA?

Admiral WINNEFELD. Really good question. Currently, it is actually an audit of the ballot boxes; it is not a recount; technical term. But that will take a little less time than an actual full recount.

But we are working very closely—Joe Dunford over there is working very closely to support this process as best we can to get it done quickly, expeditiously, and get an answer to this question so we can have a President of Afghanistan who can be a partner.

And so, if we can manage this through the timeframe that we think that is going to take. If it goes much beyond, let's say, mid-September, then we are starting to get into a little tougher situation in order to be able to do an orderly withdrawal by the end of the year.

Now, we still will have a SOFA with them, so there is, you know, it is not like the end of the world. But we have placed as an end point the end of this year that we will have to be out of there if we don't have a BSA.

Mr. BARBER. Thank you.

Admiral WINNEFELD. And a BSA, more than anything else—

Mr. BARBER. Thank you.

Admiral WINNEFELD. The BSA is a statement of partnership from the government of Afghanistan.

Mr. BARBER. All right. My time is up. Thank you, gentlemen.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to thank all three of you for being here. My appreciation of what you are doing is very personal.

Admiral, one of my sons is serving in the Navy today. And then I am very grateful—I served representing Parris Island, Marine Corps Air Station, Beaufort Naval Hospital, and so, I know firsthand the extraordinary troops.

And I appreciate, Secretary Work, your pointing out the extraordinary success of our troops in serving in Afghanistan.

My youngest son just returned—he is an engineer with SUTA [Split Unit Training Assembly] Army National Guard—from his service for a year in Afghanistan.

My former National Guard unit, the 218th Brigade, served there. So, I know and I have seen—I have been there 12 times—what is being done for the people of Afghanistan, which is really to protect us, because that is—of course, it was from the caves—people need to remember, it was from the caves of Afghanistan that Osama bin Laden planned the attacks on the United States, September 11th, 2001.

With that said, I am equally concerned about the reduction in end strength of the Army and Marine Corps. And we have learned recently about the management situation on this—that there are troops in Afghanistan that have been informed that they are being separated from the Army.

The media has said there are soldiers are receiving pink slips. It is wrong that you have troops serving overseas receiving these notices and they have to think about transition to civilian life—transition back home. I just—surely something is being done to address this.

Admiral WINNEFELD. Very important point—and that is keeping faith with our force as we draw down. Because of the budget pressures we are under, we don't have a choice; we have to get smaller. That is a fact that we cannot circumvent; the question is can we do it in a compassionate way.

Mr. WILSON. Right.

Admiral WINNEFELD. And I may be wrong here, and I would have to consult with Ray Odierno, but Ray has been—and Jim Amos both with our ground forces have been incredibly considerate and compassionate, trying to make sure that we do this without yanking the rug out from underneath our troops. So, I don't believe that anybody is being told to leave before the end of their enlistment. They at least have the predictability of fulfilling their enlistment. But I would want to check to make sure that that was accurate.

But, again, it—and we are doing everything we can to support their departure from the military so that they have a successful transition into civilian life when it has to happen. But there is no question that we have wonderful young men and women in this country who are going to want to serve in the United States military who are not going to be able to do so.

Secretary WORK. And sir, if I could just say—this goes back to the chairman's I think very good point at the beginning of the hearing—the President does not want to get down to the sequestration level. He has made that very clear.

If we go down to the sequestration level, the number of troops that we would have on Active Duty would be even much smaller than what we are planning for, which is at \$115 billion above the

BCA [Budget Control Act] caps over the course of the fit-up. So, your point is, I think, spot-on.

If we go to the BCA levels, then it becomes even more hard—it becomes harder to keep young men and women who want to serve their Nation in uniform because we have to get smaller, as the vice chairman said.

Mr. WILSON. Well, we want to work with you. And we actually even want to work with the President.

But it should be noted that it was the President's plan, defense sequestration, according to Bob Woodward, in his book. And so, this needs to be addressed.

I am also concerned, Secretary Work, you stated and somehow the American people believe that the war is ending. I believe that we are in a long-term global war on terrorism.

We know that it began out of caves in Afghanistan September 11th, 2001. But additionally, we have particularly, in the last year, Doctor Fred Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute has brought to our attention that Al Qaeda terrorists have spread across North Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia; that is in the last year.

Additionally, we know that in the last month, the extraordinary city of Mosul and significant parts of Iraq have been seized by Al Qaeda operatives and their allies.

Really, they are trying to accomplish their goal—death to Israel, death to America. The American people need to know—we are in a long-term war.

So, what is your view about the global war on terrorism?

Secretary WORK. Well, sir, I see the point. I did not mean to—what I meant to say is that our combat operations mission in Afghanistan would end at the end of the year, but we still have a lot of hard work with our Afghan partners to get them together.

And I also agree that the situation in the Middle East, the situation in the Western Pacific, the situation in Eastern Europe—all of these things are of major concern to Secretary Hagel and the Joint Chiefs and the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund really is designed to get after that—the global fight against terrorist networks.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you for your—

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ms. Duckworth.

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, one of our principal responsibilities here as Members of Congress and especially in this committee is to conduct rigorous oversight of defense programs and policies.

Especially concerned with the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund proposal under OCO funding. I support the larger strategy for this money, but I am also very, very concerned about its specifics.

My understanding is that to increase flexibility, the administration wants CTPF funds to be available for 3 years and to be able to transfer them to any DOD account or to a specified State Department account or to transfer the money between the two departments. And these monies could be spent anywhere overseas.

This seems like a lot of leeway that really hampers Congress' oversight mission. Mr. Work and also Mr. McCord, if you could an-

swer that aspect about—it seems this has become yet another slush fund where you can just transfer it between accounts without accountability and you can transfer it even between departments and you are asking for \$5 billion, which seems like a large amount of money to have that little oversight on.

Secretary WORK. Ma'am, again, we do not consider this a slush fund. We want to work with Congress to provide us flexibility in authorities that we already have to respond to a very, very fast-moving situation—generational change in the Middle East with all sorts of unintended problems or unexpected problems.

I do not believe that we transfer money to State, ma'am. I think it is only within DOD accounts.

Secretary MCCORD. That is correct. That was discussed in various drafts as we went through with the administration how to propose. In the end, what we proposed was that we would have a fund for ourselves and State would have theirs.

But the NSC [National Security Council], as the deputy described, NSC and OMB would be in conversation with us about funds executed from our fund or theirs that would—for looking for consistency of purpose and things like that. I would also just add that the transfers would only occur—when we transferred money, we would then come to the committees, as we have done in the past with things like 1206 with the 15-day notice and wait.

And we feel like this procedure has been fairly well-established on things like the Afghan forces and on 1206 before, of working with the committees to explain what we are trying to do and letting you see them.

So, it is at the point the money would leave the fund and go to a particular place for execution that we would be bringing it to the committees.

Secretary WORK. And just wanted to follow up, ma'am, that we would have to go to OMB and NSC and we would say this is what we would like to do. We would have to get their oversight approval and then we would have to come to Congress and give the 15-day notification and wait.

So, we do not believe it is a slush fund that will allow us to just go willy-nilly. We think there are going to be all sorts of checks and balances.

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Okay. On the portion of the OCO request that provides provision for Syria, a few things stood out to me. I understand that \$1 billion has been preliminarily allocated for the Syria Regional Stabilization Initiative, and \$500 million of that is to provide assistance to moderate elements of the Syrian opposition, including proposed authority to train and equip and vet elements of the Syrian army opposition.

Admiral, can you speak a little bit to, and perhaps clarify, the details in terms of the types of training, the equipment to be provided, the number of fighters that would be trained? Who is going to train them? Is it us, our allies? Where are they being trained? How are we vetting these fighters? And what type of equipment are we giving them?

Admiral WINNEFELD. Unfortunately, and by the way, thank you for your service.

Unfortunately, a lot of that is classified and I wouldn't be able to talk about it in a hearing like this. But I would say that we are coming together on the construct of a plan that would train moderate oppositionists in the country of Syria. We would train them outside Syria, obviously. I can't get into where we would do that.

We would provide them with weapons, intelligence, logistic support, military advice. And they would conduct the insurgency struggle and also counter ISIL potentially inside Syria.

And I could be happy to sit down with you privately and go into more detail, particularly as we get towards a decision on that. I want to make sure the President has his decisions based on this to decide what it is—how he wants to configure this. But we do have a very good gelling together of a plan to do it.

Ms. DUCKWORTH. I would hope that you would be—thank you for offering to be available to brief the plan. And I hope that that would be available to the entire committee, or at the very least the committee leadership on a classified basis, I am sure.

Also, I am very concerned with making sure we maintain oversight to make sure that any armaments we transfer to moderate rebels doesn't end up in the hands of folks that are not friendly to us.

I am out of time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. THORNBERRY [presiding]. Thank you.

Mr. Turner.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Work, Admiral Winnefeld, thank you for being here. I appreciate your attempt to answer questions that I think perhaps may be unanswerable at this point, which is part of our concern.

I want to associate myself with Ms. Duckworth's comments. The reason why people are concerned about this being a slush fund is because these are very large numbers and the detail is lacking. But they are concerned not just because of the concern of waste or that you may be ineffective in addressing serious issues. It is the issue of that we want to know what you are going to do because we are concerned about the outcomes here, not just the outcome of spending, the outcomes of what you are trying to accomplish.

And that brings me to the European Reassurance Initiative. I am obviously very supportive of the European Reassurance Initiative when you look at the backdrop of what Russia has been doing. I believe the administration has been pursuing a false narrative with Russia that they are not an adversary. And Russia obviously has declared itself an adversary.

But what we learned from General Breedlove with the new aggressiveness of Russia, both in its military posture and its actions, is that it has undertaken a number of snap exercises on the border of some NATO countries, and certainly Ukraine, as we have seen in Ukraine, that developed into actually an invasion force.

So I am concerned that, one, the whole fact that we need a European Reassurance Initiative is because the operational funds for our presence in Europe have been cut too much. And two, there has been a lack of recognition of really the threat of what we were facing.

Admiral Winnefeld, could you provide us some additional detail as to what you see? For example, has General Breedlove given you

details as to what types of exercises and initiatives would occur here? He has talked about a lack of readiness on the part of our forces and European forces if Russia should continue its aggressive stance.

And Secretary Work, you indicated that these funds were temporary. I don't—surely you don't believe that Russia's new posture is a temporary one, so hopefully you mean it is temporary in that you would need these funds to be incorporated into larger spending—sustained larger spending in the out-years. If you could explain that.

Admiral.

Admiral WINNEFELD. A couple of things. First of all, I think it is important to remember that the base budget for the DOD was submitted before any of this happened. And so this is essentially trying to recover from that, quite honestly, that there are initiatives we need to do in order to support particularly our Eastern European partners who are a little—not quite as strong as some of our Western European partners from a defense perspective.

General Breedlove has already done a large number of things, and I am not going to eat up the clock by describing all of those, but it is significant force movements that we are taking out of hide with Air Force movements from Italy into various countries to support them with company-level training and the like.

In terms of the ERI initiatives, though, they would do a number of things. An armored brigade combat team presence, which is quite expensive, we would be able to maintain that for a while longer; live deployments in the Black Sea; more Baltic air policing; deploying forces to train with Moldova, Georgia; a few more NATO exercises; increasing some of the training range capabilities and training sites in Bulgaria we would be doing; weapons storage at Camp Darby in Italy, upgrading that; and a number of other increased activities across Central and Eastern Europe.

And you are correct. I think some of those are actually going to have to be enduring. We are going to have to fold those into perhaps next year's base budget submission. But some of them, as the deputy secretary I think has pointed out in other testimony, are 1-year type things in that you would upgrade a facility, for example, a prepositioning facility that is something that would be a one-time expenditure. I think that is where we were coming from in terms of short term.

Mr. TURNER. Secretary Work, so you would agree that this is not going to be a temporary? And by the way, you should probably rename this, instead of European Reassurance Initiative, the Responding to Russian Aggression Fund instead.

But Secretary Work?

Secretary WORK. Well, sir, your overall point, we are going through European infrastructure consolidation right now that will not take out any further forces than were already in the baseline plan. As the vice chairman said, this was to react to a situation on the ground in Eastern Europe.

Mr. TURNER. But you believe this is going to have to be sustained, right? You don't see the Russian aggression, their current posture being a temporary circumstance? You do believe that this fund is because we have cut too far and we have to reinvest?

Secretary WORK. Well, what we will do, sir, is in the fall review, we will readdress this as part of a broader look at our portfolio and take this in——

Mr. TURNER. Well, this is a yes or no question. Do you believe this circumstance to be temporary, that it will not require additional funding in the future?

Secretary WORK. The ERI, I am not certain we would ever come back in the OCO, but I agree with you that what is happening in Europe will cause us to look over the longer term and what our investments will need to be.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Secretary Work.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you.

Ms. Gabbard.

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for your service and for being here.

I have a couple of questions with regard to the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund, but just first want to comment on why there is so much hesitation here I think from many of my colleagues and myself about the lack of detail.

Mr. Work, you commented earlier—made a comment that struck me as you spoke about the need for flexibility in funding for Iraq, that it is your and the administration's position that it is agreed that we must do something, but we are not sure what.

And I think that assumption is what is troubling, that it should not be a given. As we look at the different conflicts that are occurring whether it be in Iraq or in other places, that we assume that we must do something because sometimes the answer to that question of what is in the best interests for us, the United States, the American people, the answer may be to not take action in that particular situation.

So that assumption that we must do something, in particular with what is happening in Iraq right now, is where many of us are concerned about writing this kind of blank check to fund that something, if that something is not the right course of action to take.

With regards to the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund, I think Congresswoman Duckworth asked a few questions, but I am wondering who are the targeted recipients of that funding, both in Syria and Iraq? And what are the objectives for providing that support? And the follow-on question to that is: Why is this requirement part of this undefined transfer fund and not a very direct request of Congress to provide assistance?

Secretary WORK. Again, ma'am, talking about the specifics of the Syrian aspect of the fund, we wouldn't be able to get too much into in an open hearing.

Ms. GABBARD. Is the intent of this funding to assist rebel forces as they seek to overthrow the government? Or is it to target terrorist threats?

Secretary WORK. Both, ma'am; \$500 million would be associated with our partners around the area, so that includes Lebanon and—excuse me—Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Turkey; and then \$500 million would be to provide training and support to vetted Syrian opposition units. To your initial question, I agree with you that the

President may decide not to do something and that is—the purpose of this is to provide us the flexibility, when and if we do. And again, we have tried to build in the oversight so that we would not automatically start spending money without congressional understanding of what we were doing.

Ms. GABBARD. Okay. Thank you. I have got one last question with regards to the CTPF funding and how that allocation of funds will be determined by region and at this juncture which COCOM [combatant command] stands to benefit the most from this fund. How is that determination made?

Admiral WINNEFELD. The lion's share of really—is where is the threat coming from. And a lion's share of the terrorist threat is coming from the Central Command region. So when you consider Syria, part of Central Command; if there is support we are going to provide within Lebanon or Iraq or elsewhere, that is all in Central Command area of responsibility. But there is Northern Africa, where there is a considerable terrorist threat and Eastern Africa. Of course, that is AFRICOM [Africa Command] area of responsibility. So those are probably the two principal areas. But that is not to rule out that terrorist threat that emanates from some other region could not be addressed by using—

Ms. GABBARD. And how do we ensure that these funds don't end up being duplicative to other efforts that are being executed or pursued by Department of State or other agencies?

Admiral WINNEFELD. We have a good interagency process where we talk about our contingencies and the planning that we work through in a particular area. We have a very robust group that looks at Africa, a very robust look at Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, same thing with Eastern Africa, Al Shabaab in Somalia. And there is a lot of de-confliction that occurs in that forum. And the intent, of course, is to have complementary efforts, not stove-piped or isolated efforts. And so I think we have a fairly good process for working through those challenges.

Ms. GABBARD. I guess it is—I just hope that in both departments that the feedback from folks on the ground, especially is being welcomed and heard, because oftentimes, as you know, some people can sit in a room up here without understanding exactly what is happening on the ground.

Admiral WINNEFELD. It is a good point. And the lion's share of those meetings we have a VTC [video teleconference] with the combatant commander actually having a representative and, you know, participating in the meeting.

Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wittman.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank, Mr. Chairman. And Secretary Work, Secretary McCord, Admiral Winnefeld, thank you so much for joining us and thanks for your service. I want to begin by asking a question to all of you all. Looking at the OCO budget as it is presented, there is a heavy emphasis on post-Afghanistan transition. Can you tell me where in the budget are we emphasizing the reset of our forces, specifically those outside a weapons acquisition?

Secretary WORK. OCO includes \$9.2 billion for reset. We expect a future OCO request to have additional money. As we have been saying all along, we believe that the reset of our equipment will

take a couple—2 or 3 years after we cease our combat operations in Afghanistan. We are in the process of bringing back an enormous amount of gear that some of it has to be refurbished, upgraded, and we have to determine whether we need to get rid of it or replace it. So \$9 billion in the OCO is for that.

Mr. WITTMAN. How about specifically for training? I understand the equipment reset and the equipment going to depots, but how about on the training side?

Secretary WORK. There is nothing in the OCO, as far as training of forces back in the United States. That has not normally been included in the OCO request. So that is included in our base budget.

Mr. WITTMAN. So you believe the base budget adequately addresses that and fully executing the reset can be accomplished in the base budget?

Secretary WORK. I would say, sir, that readiness of our forces and our future readiness, we all recognize that we are going to go through a 1- or 2-year trough in readiness, as we reset the force and as we come out of Afghanistan. So it is tight. It is extremely tight. And if we go to the BCA levels, it will be even tighter. And the chairman has already said he believes the risks of going to the BCA level would be unacceptable.

Mr. WITTMAN. Well, then put this in context, what are the risks of not fully executing a reset, not just the equipment, but the training side? And what does that mean for us, whether it is the capability of our forces or making sure that the industrial base is there to make sure we have that capacity necessary going forward? Give me your perspective on what happens if we don't fully execute the reset in its entirety?

Admiral WINNEFELD. It goes without saying that the ability to reset results in the deployability of your force for future conflicts. We have a very good understanding of what various contingencies around the world could require, whether it is a Korea contingency, Iran contingency, you name it.

And that—all those—that calculus went into the formulation of the budget request for next year and indeed, into the strategy that accompanies the QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review]. Can you defeat one adversary while denying the objectives of another?

And as the deputy secretary pointed out, it is very fragile. It is extremely fragile right now and it will be for several years while we reset the force, while we recover our readiness.

By the end of the 5-year plan, the way—with the President's budget request, which is above sequester, we believe that we will be there and as we have described, you know, with moderate but on the high band of that moderate risk as I said in my QDR testimony.

Mr. WITTMAN. Let me ask under this scenario: What happens if after this year, OCO goes away and then on top of that, we have sequester?

Can you give me an indication about the risk and the scenarios we face looking at those two situations?

Admiral WINNEFELD. I will go even further than that.

If we have—if we lost OCO next year—because it is going to take us a while to recover, particularly to reset the force—if we just lost it completely next year and if we go back to sequester and if we

don't get the compensation savings that we are asking for, and we are asked to retain systems that we believe that we need to divest, if all of that comes together then you will have a broken force at the end of the day.

It won't just be a hollow force; it will be a broken force. And we will not be able to execute even close to what the strategy asks us to do.

Secretary WORK. I fully endorse those comments, Congressman.

Right now, if you take a look at the defense industry, the reason why I think they are doing so well in terms of their share prices is they have been ruthless in cutting their overhead.

We have not been able to do a BRAC [Base Closure and Realignment]. We haven't been able to do some of the compensation savings—

Mr. WITTMAN. Secretary Work, I am limited in time.

Let me go to this. I understand the technical explanation of that but give us an illustration about what that risk would mean either to the Nation or to our men and women that serve, just a simple illustration so people can understand that.

Admiral WINNEFELD. If we were—and again, I want to stay out of classified—

Mr. WITTMAN. Sure.

Admiral WINNEFELD [continuing]. Contingency pieces.

But if we were to have a major contingency somewhere in the world, we would not be able to respond as fast or as robustly or with troops that are trained to the task.

And with that comes blood, it comes time and it comes additional cost.

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. That you are planning for \$100-plus billion over BCA. And you both now just addressed again the problem that we have with sequester, but that is the law.

I mean, I am violently opposed. I have talked about it ad nauseum. But it still is the law. So I hope you are also planning to follow the law.

And then the statement you just made, Admiral, about the broken force, we have got 6 members of the committee here in the room out of now 62 and most Members of Congress don't have any concept of what you are talking about.

I hope that you can give us what you mean by a broken force. I understand that we don't—maybe we need to have a classified session on just that because something is going to have to happen to inform Congress to the point where they get rid of sequester next year. Because if they don't, I don't think any of us want to see the consequences.

So you need to speak up more often. Even I still need to speak up more often. But we need to have some information, some anecdotal or some—something that people can relate to and understand that are not on this committee, that don't deal with this on a daily basis.

Mr. Larsen.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

When I was a kid in Arlington, Washington, you know, we didn't have smartphones then—of course, no one had smartphones then—so we would make up games.

We had a game we played outside. I am one of eight kids so a lot of kids, a lot of neighborhood kids. We played a game called dogpile.

It is a very simple game. You picked one person to be "it"; they ran away from the group and you jumped on them and you dog-piled on them and then it was someone else's turn, just one big dogpile.

So I am going to play dogpile on this terrorism fund because—Admiral WINNEFELD. Should we try to run away?

Mr. LARSEN. What is that?

Admiral WINNEFELD. Should we try to run away?

Mr. LARSEN. No, you are safe there. You are safe there.

Because we have developed 1206 and the Global Security Contingency Fund—and this argument about being a slush fund or not, I don't really buy that. I don't agree with folks who are accusing that.

My question is the need. If we have 1206, we have the Global Security Contingency Fund, we are using those, what makes this counterterrorism fund so different?

If you have to jump through all the interagency hoops that you have laid out and all the agreements in order to implement spending out of this proposed fund—you are already jumping through a lot of interagency hoops—what makes this so different than what we have already done? Because you are not doing a very good job of explaining that.

Secretary WORK. Sir, we had a debate.

One of the ways we could have come forward is to say, "We would like to raise the cap in 1206 this much, raise the cap in 1207, 1208," and that would have presupposed that we would have known exactly how we would have used those authorities over the course of the next year.

What this is, is it provides us with the flexibility to come to the President and Congress and say, "We would like to exceed the caps in these particular authorities that Congress has already given us due to things that are happening right now in the world."

That is what is different. This provides us with a little bit more flexibility.

Again—

Mr. LARSEN. So what about the existing authorities and their flexibilities? Speak to that. What about them is so inflexible?

Secretary MCCORD. I would just cite two examples.

I think both for legal reasons and for—as a matter of national policy, Syria is of such import that coming to Congress for a positive authority like this is the right answer in addition to the fact that there are particular things like working with irregular forces that probably are not doable under just straight 1206-type authorities that we have today.

Another example, we—I think all of us believe it has been a good course of action for us to support what the French are doing in Mali. But because they are not a developing country, we are very limited in what we can do to support them.

And this would allow us to exceed those type of caps that we have on helping countries, even—it is still cost-effective for us to do so. It is a good idea for us to do so but legally, we are constrained. And just having 1206 as it stands today or the other authorities we have today are not enough to allow us to be more robust on that effort.

Mr. LARSEN. Go ahead, Admiral.

Admiral WINNEFELD. I was going to say, this is about two things: It is about quantity and flexibility.

And we are trying to establish a sustainable counterterrorism framework wherever we need it around the global, principally, as I mentioned earlier, in the Central Command, in Africa Command areas of responsibility but it could be elsewhere.

So essentially, we would like to have more in the resource area in order to be able to do that.

Now the question, as you point out, is where do you put it?

And we could put it in what we anticipate to be the right categories and we are always wrong.

And for example, this year, we are really running out of 1208 money far quicker than anything else. But we are stuck.

So what would be, you know, an alternative would be to plus-up the funds to the quantity that we think we need and then give us the transfer authority, again, with consultation, with Congress, 15 days, to be able to freely move among those funds so that if I need more 1208 and I have got some extra in 1206 then we can just move the money.

But it would seem to us to be more reasonable to just have this fund here, which we consult with Congress on and that if we need to plus-up 1208-like activity then we can do it.

It is really a matter of having the flexibility to act quickly to get things done around the world in favor of a sustainable CT [counterterrorism] framework.

Mr. LARSEN. Yes, I just—I know we are jumping on you about 8 to 9 percent of this total request.

But we put a lot of work in the last decade into developing 1206 and the security fund. And now you need this and it just seems a little backwards is all.

So thanks for trying to explain a little better for me. I appreciate it.

I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Scott.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I want to get to the reset in a second. But Admiral, certainly, I have a tremendous amount of respect for you and you just used the term, if I may, “consult with Congress.”

Was there any consultation with Congress prior to the action that was taken in Libya?

Admiral WINNEFELD. You are talking about the——

Mr. SCOTT. I am talking about the action to take Gadhafi out.

Admiral WINNEFELD. Yes, I wasn't here at the time, so I couldn't answer that question completely.

Mr. SCOTT. With due respect to all of you, and I think this is where your problem is coming with this, including with myself, I

got a message 5 minutes prior to Fox News reporting that we were sending Patriot missiles into Libya. I would have objected to the action. I think that the northern portion of Africa was probably more secure then than it is now.

And as I read through the statement, it says, and I will quote—"as part of the Syria Regional Stabilization Initiative, we are seeking \$500 million to train and equip" and it goes from there, "this effort represents a critical long-term investment to build Syrian capacity."

This country would be in a war in Syria right now, had this Congress, including myself, not objected to the action that the President wanted to take.

I maintain that we were right to not get involved in Syria. And my concern is that if we pass this, if the President had this authority a year ago, we would be involved in a war in Syria right now.

And the term "long-term commitment," Americans are tired of being at war. I know those of you who serve in uniform are tired of it. I hear it from the soldiers that I represent. We have been over there. Desert Storm was almost 25 years ago. Desert Storm was almost 25 years ago.

We have spent billions, if not trillions. And look at what is happening in Iraq right now.

And so, I—it seems to me that the administration's position is that they are gonna ask forgiveness instead of permission. They did not consult with us on Libya. I do not have any reason to believe that they would change and consult with us on this, going forward. And I have serious reservations about the ability to support that, especially with regard to the terms that we continue to use, a hollow force, a broken force. We are laying off United States soldiers.

And I want to get, real quick, to the reset of the equipment and the sequester. And my primary concern is that if we are not able to repeal the sequester, which I voted against, what will happen to our depots and what impact will that have in our depots providing the necessary services to reset the equipment?

And are they prepared and resourced to reset the equipment if the sequester goes into effect?

Secretary WORK. If a sequester goes into effect at the full level, and/or if OCO drops down, then we would have to do a total relook at our strategy; we would have to do a total relook at our program and our budget. We would try to maintain the depots, to the greatest extent that we could. But all of our efforts to keep a balanced force, between personnel costs, investment cost, MILCON [military construction], and R&D [research and development], it would be extremely difficult.

So, sir, I can't give you an exact prognostication on what would happen to the depots, but every single aspect of our force would be under severe stress.

Admiral WINNEFELD. Yes, I couldn't agree more, that the less work you have for the depots, the less people are employed by the depots, the more fragile they become, and the like.

So we are very cognizant of that. I know that Frank Kendall, who is our AT&L [Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics] director, very cognizant of that. And it is something we have got to manage

very carefully. We only have a certain number of resources we can apply.

To the first part of your question, I do want to briefly address it, if I could. And that is, there is a unanimous view inside all of the decisionmaking apparatus I participate in that we are not gonna put boots on the ground. This is not gonna be an Iraq or an Afghanistan war in Syria. It is not even gonna be a war.

What we are talking about is not walking away from a potential ungoverned space where a terrorist activity can operate to threaten the United States.

Mr. SCOTT. Admiral, we use the terms “hollow” and “broken.” There is only so much that the United States can do. And we have no OCO funding after 2015. If we don’t have OCO funding, what would happen to our depots and our reset of the equipment?

Admiral WINNEFELD. If you don’t have the OCO funding at all, then, as the deputy secretary mentioned, you know, \$9 billion of this is for reset. And a substantial part of that reset, almost all of it, is to the depots to reset vehicles and other equipment, helicopters and the like.

If we don’t have that money, then we can’t spend it in the depots.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, gentlemen.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to drill down on two issues—Syria and then the contingency fund that we are worried about, or the—not contingency—combating terrorism partnership fund.

I think, you know, I would certainly agree that, you know, that flexibility is important. I mean, if you look at what has happened with Al Qaeda, and this has been the big transition from, okay, they are a set force that is plotting and planning against the West, let’s go hit that group and before they hit us, basically, and we did that fairly effectively and, you know—well, we did it too late in Afghanistan, but once we did it, we did it effectively. We have been doing it in Pakistan and doing it in Yemen.

But now, Al Qaeda has sort of spread. I mean you have got ISIL, which is, you know, they have decided they are not affiliated with Al Qaeda, but that doesn’t make them any less of a threat. It has become a battle against the ideology, and that ideology can pop up in a bunch of different places, and sometimes it is, you know, and the threat is different. Boko Haram is different from what is going on in Libya, is different from what is going on in Somalia. You know, how do you evaluate those threats and respond to them?

And our authorities do have you a little boxed in in terms of how you do that.

So I get that. I mean, the problem is that as my staff reads what has been put together here, to be honest, they are more knowledgeable about the stuff than I am, if you wanted to take this money and use it to refuel an aircraft carrier, there is nothing in this language that stops you from doing that.

So we—I mean, first of all, do you disagree with that? And second of all, if not—we just—we have got to fence it in somehow. And from my understanding is, it is not terribly well-fenced. And that is a structural problem, and it is also a concern in that it wasn’t

as well thought out as it should have been before it was put into this.

So help me out. You know, is it wrong to say that you could spend this to refuel an aircraft carrier? And, if so, what is the language in there that clearly restricts that?

Secretary McCORD. Well, certainly, as you know, that is not our intent or design. We don't think the language is that broad. The——

Mr. SMITH. Let me say right, if I could, your intent and your design are, I am sorry, irrelevant to this conversation. It is a piece of legislation, so we want to know what is in the legislation. So let's move past that first point, and you were on to the second one.

Secretary McCORD. Right. The second point—and I assume you are particularly talking about the new fund.

Mr. SMITH. Yes.

Secretary McCORD. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. I mean, it is \$5 billion.

Secretary McCORD. Right.

Mr. SMITH. And the way this place works is, you know, \$5 billion has parameters or no parameters, you know, we approve it, it goes up to you guys. And then you live within those numbers.

Now, I have been around here long enough to know that that is far from a black and white issue. There is a whole lot of gray in there, and people operate in the gray.

But at least I would like to start out with some kind of parameters.

Secretary McCORD. Right. Certainly our counsels stand ready to work with yours. We stand ready to work with you and your staff if this is not drafted the way that you think it should be. But, first of all, there is a purpose to the fund, and refueling an aircraft carrier, I don't really think fits the purpose, but more importantly——

Mr. SMITH. Okay, again, I am sorry——

Secretary McCORD [continuing]. Language——

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. That is a troubling way to put it. You don't really think. Tell me. You wrote the darn thing. We are up here.

Okay, here is the sentence, it says this, that clearly restricts that and clearly wouldn't allow that. I am not hearing that from you.

Secretary McCORD. The concern that we have heard in the briefings our staff has done is with the notwithstanding phrase. And the notwithstanding phrase pertains to amounts and recipients for things like building partnership. We don't interpret that as notwithstanding all laws, as has been, I think, raised as a concern at some staff briefings. We think that we have identified what we are trying to waive or withstand.

Mr. SMITH. Right. And, you know, I mean, the language, I just have it in front of me here, basically, "such funds shall be available under the authority provided by any of the provisional law to enhance counterterrorism and crisis response activities undertaken by the armed forces and to provide support and assistance to foreign security forces, irregular forces, groups or individuals to conduct, support or facilitate counterterrorism crisis response activities."

I mean, again, you know, well, we are sending an aircraft carrier into the Gulf because, you know, we are worried about what, you know, terrorist groups are doing.

I am telling you, this is really, really poorly drafted in terms of narrowing it down to a specific set of purposes.

So I have made that point, won't keep making it. I will just say, (a) this has got to be fixed; (b) it is really not good that it came to us in this form in the first place. And, you know, not to echo Mr. Scott's opinion, because I disagree with a lot of what he said, but that is why it never hurts to talk to Congress. We could point these things out, other than in a public hearing and work our way down to it.

So let's just work on that piece of it, which brings me to the second point, and that is Syria.

And this one really concerns me, and it concerns me because I think the policy is correct, all right? I think it is way past time that we got title 10, DOD involved in working with, however you want to describe them, moderate, non-Al Qaeda, sympathetic forces, to help them in any way we can.

It is not—and the frustrating part is, and I know a lot of this is classified. We do know who they are. You know, every time this comes up, people say, "We don't even know who we are talking about funding." We know, okay? We don't know all of them, but there is some number of people within Syria who are involved in the fight against Assad who are not sympathetic to al-Nusra, who are not sympathetic to ISIL, who we have been working closely with for a number of years now, okay?

Is that number 100, 1,000, 4,000? I don't know, but there is some number of them unequivocally who exist and who have been getting the crap kicked out of them for the last couple of years because they are under-gunned, they are unfunded. The wack jobs have money coming in from all over the place. These guys have been getting it in dribs and drabs from us.

We would like to open that aperture up just a little bit. And I think that is an incredibly important policy because if we don't do it, we are in a situation where all you have is Assad, Hezbollah, and Iran on one side, and Al Qaeda and worse than Al Qaeda on the other side.

Now, that makes 100 percent perfect sense to me that we need to back these people. But it hasn't been well explained. You know, I had a colleague of mine who sits on the Defense Approps [Appropriations] subcommittee yesterday say they had the same briefing from you and you basically couldn't tell them what the fund was for or who it was going to.

So we need to do better than "it is classified so we really can't talk about it." I want you to sell this successfully, which means you have got to sell it, right? You have got to make the case: Here is why this is important.

And so if you could sell us right now on why it is that we should be pumping money into these Syrian groups. Because I don't just agree with Mr. Scott that this is somehow equivalent to starting another war. I mean, there is plenty of—you know, there is plenty of distance between us sending in 100,000 troops to Syria and us

backing people who are already fighting there who are critically important to do what we are trying to do.

But give us another shot here. What is the Syria money for and why is it so important?

Admiral WINNEFELD. Sir, I—there are two questions here: Why and how?

And I think you have done a very artful job in the last couple of minutes describing the “why.” We have an ungoverned space. There are two problems, right? The ungoverned space in which groups like ISIL and al-Nusra are capitalizing. And without getting into classified information, indications are that they have the potential to not only create instability inside Syria, with the neighbors, and U.S. interests elsewhere in the world, to include potential attacks on the United States.

So there is plenty of “why” on the ISIL and al-Nusra front side alone, much less the carnage that has been happening in Syria over the last few years because of what the regime has been doing. So the “why” I think is fairly solid.

The “how” is the question, and in a classified hearing, I can’t really discuss it in any kind of detail—and we are still frankly working through what are some fairly challenging legal issues, some fairly challenging partner issues, process issues—and by the way, partner issues outside and inside Syria.

But we are congealing what I think is a pretty good way forward for this, that the amount of money we are requesting, or that we envision inside this request—the \$500 million—is a pretty reasonable planning factor for what we would expect to do.

Mr. SMITH. And one part of the “how,” if I may offer the suggestion, the specifics of the “how,” you know, but right up front, you say, “Well, what we are going to do is we are going to train and equip.” Okay? Now, how we get to train and equip, that is going to be difficult.

But that is where I think it goes off the beam a little bit. When you get to the “how,” you say, you know, (a) we can’t talk about it; (b) we haven’t really quite figured it out. That doesn’t inspire confidence or support in a controversial plan.

I would suggest better the “how” is we want to train them and equip them so that they are better positioned to fight. Then you can say, you know, how we do that, where we do that, we are working that out, but we do have partners, and we are confident it can happen. But if we don’t better train and equip these guys, they are going to get killed and they are not going to be there. And that is what this money is for.

Admiral WINNEFELD. Right. So if I can repeat back for possible correction, you are exactly right. We do want to train and equip the moderate members of the opposition so they can go in there and do essentially three things. They can counter the more radical elements of the opposition who are targeting them. They can undertake to place the Assad regime under such pressure that they are not under right now, that would cause them to come to the negotiating table. And at the same time, they can defend themselves and their families.

Mr. SMITH. They can survive.

Admiral WINNEFELD. That is the intent. The precise details of how we do that, I just can't share right now.

Mr. SMITH. I understand that.

I guess the final thing I will say is I know there is a lot going on in the world. I am painfully aware of the fact that there is a lot going on in the world. But if the White House is going to push a policy like this, they have got to fricking push the policy, all right?

They can't just, you know, not say anything to us forever, you know, move into and then, well, here is \$500 million we are going to—I mean, for the United States Congress to vote to authorize a train and equip mission for rebel forces is a big damned deal. And I think it is something we ought to do, but this is more not for you guys. I mean, this is more for the White House: Sell it. Because if you don't, there ain't no way we are going to pass it.

Admiral WINNEFELD. I couldn't agree with you more. This has to do, candidly, with clocks—a clock for putting the fine details on the approach here and getting it approved where it needs to be approved, and the congressional clock of when you need to have hearings and when we need to explain. Those clocks did not match up very well in this situation and I absolutely—I am empathetic. I hate it, but it is what it is right now and we believe that eventually we will be able to consult with you and show you exactly what we are going to do with this.

Mr. SMITH. It is what it is—it has got to get better.

I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Palazzo.

Mr. PALAZZO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you all for being here today. It is really great to hear the questions and your testimony.

I am just trying to reconcile in my head just some things. I know the enacted level for fiscal year 2014 OCO was \$85 billion, and this year's 2015 request for DOD is \$58 billion. So that is about a \$27 billion, \$28 billion difference. So I am more interested, what missions are you performing in 2014 that you are no longer going to be performing in 2015 that would cause a \$27 billion or \$28 billion decrease?

Secretary WORK. Two areas—the drawdown of our combat operations in Afghanistan have been moving towards the end of this calendar year. So we will be moving down, which is one of the reasons why the amount of money in the operations and force protection line has dropped from \$26 billion to \$11 billion. So that accounts for almost \$15 billion of the drop.

The other portion is in theater because we are coming down in Afghanistan. And as the vice chairman said from the very beginning, a lot of this is indirectly support of that. That money has come down, in-theater support has come down from \$24 billion to \$18 billion. So that is another \$6 billion cut.

So, it has to do with the drawdown of our combat operations, as well as the proportional drawdown of the other things that we are doing in theater.

Mr. PALAZZO. So, you would have us believe that the entire reduction is because of the drawdown of the boots on the ground in Afghanistan and related resources. Are you certain that there is no

other missions that may be, in the area outside of Afghanistan, that are going to be reduced or cut or no longer considered?

Admiral WINNEFELD. I am not aware of any. Our presence in the Gulf is relatively stable. It is principally affected by the sequester and the readiness of our forces. And that presence is probably going to decrease over the coming years based on where the funding profile looks like it is going. But none of that has to do with the OCO piece of this.

I don't know of any missions that we are cutting off because of the \$26.7 billion decrease.

Mr. PALAZZO. As a follow-up to that, can you tell me what other missions OCO funds other than just Afghanistan?

Secretary WORK. The Joint IED Defeat Organization, the Afghan Security Force Fund, but that is obviously—as well as the Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund. That is separate from the monies that would support the operations of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. There is the Commanders' Emergency Response Program, or CERP, which was approved by Congress and we have been utilizing; unexploded ordnance removal; coalition support; Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq; reset; the temporary end strength increase for medical, as well as Army and Marine Corps.

So all those things are covered right now.

Mr. PALAZZO. Okay. Go ahead.

Admiral WINNEFELD. I was just going to say that this year's OCO is essentially all Afghanistan. Now, there are subsidiary effects. If you have more force in the Arabian Gulf region, for instance operating airfields, strike aircraft operating out of those airfields, that go into Afghanistan, then there is also a deterrent effect elsewhere in the region.

But the reason it is there and the money is for operations in Afghanistan.

This request that we are asking for is a little bit different. We are asking for the \$5 billion in the ERI and the CTPF money that would do things outside Afghanistan that would give us more flexibility in that regard.

So I want to mention this year is different from what we are requesting for next year.

Mr. PALAZZO. Okay, so counterterrorism in Yemen deterring Iran, that is not in the 2014 OCO?

Admiral WINNEFELD. There are probably things inside the Arabian Gulf region that indirectly support those because they are there supporting Afghanistan.

But the drone ops, for example, that we would be operating in a regional country that would support in Yemen would not be coming out of OCO.

Mr. PALAZZO. Okay.

Looking kind of further down, I guess, beyond 2015, what kind of funding do you see being in OCO if this is just going to be Afghanistan and similar projects?

Admiral WINNEFELD. As we draw down our presence even more in Afghanistan, the Afghanistan OCO will continue—I would imagine if OCO continues as a fund, which we anticipate it would, it would be even smaller in the years following.

And then the way we have constructed this request, we are opening it up to other areas of agility that we think we need to have for other types of operations around the globe that are contingency operations that would not be in Afghanistan.

Secretary MCCORD. I would just add that again, our OCO request, we often use Afghanistan synonymously with Operation Enduring Freedom but OEF has always had a few parts like the Philippines that have been outside Afghanistan, per se.

As the vice chairman says, one of the big questions, and as Congress reacts to the proposal we have made this time, is to broaden some of that a little bit.

We have had limited operations on, say, the Horn of Africa that have been considered OEF. But we are going farther across Africa in this proposal with this new fund.

And so how Congress disposes of our request, I think, will inform what we come back with next year as to what OCO looks like.

Mr. PALAZZO. Thank you, gentlemen.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we have been here for a couple hours and we have talked about a lot of things. But we haven't hit on Yemen, the Philippines, Horn of Africa in much detail other than just a broad "Yeah, there will be other things to spend money on."

I hope that as we move forward and actually get into some legislation, try to get this thing done.

Let's see, I think we are here for another week or so before we go, maybe 2 weeks before we go to the August break and then we are here a week or two in September.

Time is running out quickly so we do need to get to this, need to get those questions answered and move forward.

As you can see, there are bipartisan concerns with this so it is important to get it all worked out and get it right.

Thank you very much for being here with us today. Appreciate your first hearing in these—two of you in this job. You did very well.

Thank you very much. This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:18 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

JULY 16, 2014

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

JULY 16, 2014

Opening Statement of Chairman Howard P. “Buck” McKeon
HEARING ON
Fiscal Year 2015 Overseas Contingency Operations Budget Request
July 16, 2014

I would like to welcome our witnesses to today’s hearing on the Department of Defense’s Fiscal Year 2015 Overseas Contingency Operations Budget Request. We appreciate your flexibility this morning as we dispensed with other legislative matters.

Joining us today are: Mr. Bob Work, Deputy Secretary of Defense; Admiral Sandy Winnefeld, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Mr. Michael McCord, Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller.

This is the first time Mr. Work and Mr. McCord are appearing before the full committee in their new positions. I congratulate you both and look forward to working with you. However, today you have the unenviable task of explaining a late OCO request that has little detail and contains new funds and authorities that Congress heard about for the first time in the press, rather than from the Department—an occurrence that has become all too frequent. Although the NDAA has passed the House, we will continue to work with the other committees of jurisdiction to review the \$58.6 billion OCO request, and provide detailed authorizations as we go to conference.

I am deeply concerned by an emerging narrative that—based on the projection of significantly fewer troops deployed to Afghanistan in 2015—the OCO request should automatically have a proportionate reduction. U.S. contingency operations do not end with Afghanistan. As recent headlines show, U.S. forces in theater support a broad range of operations outside of Afghanistan, from the broader Middle East, to the Horn of Africa and the Philippines.

A decade of war has taken its toll on our forces. We have a moral obligation to our troops to reset the force and restore readiness. Frankly, I’m concerned that future OCO requests will not rectify the reset liabilities that currently exist.

While we continue to migrate enduring requirements from OCO to the base budget, we understand that sequestration continues to be a burden on the Department. The only way to relieve this burden is to eliminate the discretionary budget caps imposed on the military. Lastly, while my focus today is on the broader OCO request, I would also comment that the President has set up the \$5 billion dollar counterterrorism and European funds for failure. We understand that these initiatives were levied on the Department by the White House without coordination, and you’re now working to develop spending plans.

But while counterterrorism partnerships and reassuring our European allies are important and necessary, the President’s approach lacks detail and is too broad in scope. I look forward to hearing your testimony today on these important matters.

Statement of Ranking Member Adam Smith
HEARING ON
Fiscal Year 2015 Overseas Contingency Operations Budget Request
July 16, 2014

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would like to thank our witnesses for appearing here today to discuss this important subject.

The proposed Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget request presented to us today contains important funds to help complete our mission in Afghanistan. Although we are finally drawing down our troop levels in that war, our involvement in Afghanistan is not going to come to an end in the near future. The Afghan National Security Forces will require our support for many years to come. Our counterterrorism forces will almost certainly be pursuing the remnants of those who carried out the attacks of September 11th in Afghanistan and Pakistan for the next several years. We must support these continuing efforts to bring to justice those who attacked us and to prevent them from reestablishing safe havens in that region.

There are other parts of the OCO request, specifically the Combating Terrorism Partnership Fund (CTPF) and the European Reassurance Initiative that need to be explained in considerable more detail. Most members of Congress are broadly supportive of building the capacity of our international partners and understand the necessity of providing a fair amount of flexibility to the Department to carry out these activities. Nonetheless, the legislative proposal for the CTPF the Department submitted to the Congress can fairly be described as unconstrained—it is written so that it could be used for almost anything the Department does, up to and including refueling an aircraft carrier while circumventing all the normal reprogramming and transfer rules.

Part of the CTPF is intended to provide for the training and equipping of moderate Syrian rebels. I am firmly in the camp of supporting this effort. No matter what happens in Syria, whether Assad wins, or the rebels win, or it stays as a violent stalemate, we will need friends there. And even if Assad won the war, he would not be able to reestablish control over the entire country, meaning ISIL and the Al Nusra Front and other extremist terrorist groups would seek a safe haven in the ungoverned spaces. We will need to build up friendly forces to hedge against that scenario. Nonetheless, I realize that other members here today have other views on this subject and that we need to proceed cautiously. So I hope the witnesses can take some time to address this request and walk through the strategic rationale for it, how it's related to the regional problems we see in Iraq and Jordan and Lebanon, as well as discuss as many specifics about the program as they can in the forum.

The European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) also needs to be fleshed out. Russia's actions to seize the Crimean peninsula and its ongoing actions in Ukraine have reemphasized the potential threat that our NATO allies could face in Europe. While many in Congress had hoped that we could take peace in Europe for granted, that may no longer be possible, and so it makes perfect sense to consider how we should best respond. But at the same time DOD is requesting an additional \$925 million for actions to reassure our European allies, we continue to close

facilities there—on the surface, this seems to be a mixed message. What sort of reassurance are the NATO and Eastern European allies looking for—additional training opportunities or an American presence that would deter Russia? And what are we willing to provide and for how long? ERI funds would be available for two years—then what?

For the past couple of years, the House Armed Services Committee has noted in the report accompanying our version of the NDAA that large parts of the U.S. presence in the Middle East are paid for out of the OCO budget, presumably on the theory that many of these bases and assets have partly supported Afghanistan. But these bases and assets are used for far more than just Afghanistan and are unlikely to decrease substantially in size no matter what happens in Afghanistan. I am supportive of this presence in the Gulf and believe we need to be there to deter Iran and to be able to work closely with our regional allies. But funding this mission through the OCO, on top of the request for funds in Europe and even the train and equip mission for Syria, raises the question of the future of the OCO.

In the past, OCO funding was restricted to, more or less, things related to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. That rule, looking at some of these requests and some of the proposed uses of “in-theater support” funds, clearly no longer applies. Both the ERI and the CTPF could be used for the general procurement of equipment—even in the justification materials provided by DOD, one possible use would be buying helicopters for SOCOM for general “crisis response”. We just passed an NDAA out of the House that included funds for just these sorts of purposes. So it raises the question, where did this request and others like it come from? Did they arise in the time since the President submitted his budget request? If the Department sent over these requests with the intent to use OCO to ease the pain of sequestration, I can totally understand that. Personally, I would vastly prefer if this House would just vote to repeal sequestration entirely even if we can’t come up with a rational “all of the above” fix to our budget problems, but we have not behaved responsibly on this subject for quite a while and there is little prospect of that changing in the near future. But if the case is otherwise, if we have new urgent purposes for these emergency funds, I hope our witnesses can help explain them here today for us and the American people.

Again, I would like to thank the witnesses for appearing today.

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**PREPARED STATEMENT
OF
THE HONORABLE ROBERT O. WORK
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
AND
ADMIRAL JAMES A. WINNEFELD, JR, USN
VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
BEFORE THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
ON THE FY 2015 OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS BUDGET
REQUEST FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

WEDNESDAY, JULY 16, 2014

Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, we very much appreciate the opportunity to be here this morning. On behalf of Secretary Chuck Hagel, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey, and the men and women in uniform we serve, we want to thank this committee for your continued support of our troops who every day are conducting operations on behalf of our nation's security in very volatile, complex, and dangerous parts of the world.

It is with those ongoing operations in mind, that we want to address the Fiscal Year 2015 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) request, which the President recently submitted to Congress. As you know, we did not include a detailed OCO budget with the Department's base budget request in March since decisions had not yet been made concerning the number and activities of U.S. forces in Afghanistan after December, 2014. Pending these decisions, we included a placeholder of \$79.4 billion, which was simply last year's request. In the weeks since the rollout of our base budget, after conducting an extensive policy review that drew upon the best military advice of our commanders on the ground, including General Austin and General Dunford, President Obama announced post-2014 troop levels in Afghanistan. The President based his decision on the continued progress of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), which have demonstrated much-improved competence and capability in the field.

As the President said in his May 28 speech at West Point, our objectives in Afghanistan are clear: disrupting threats posed by al Qaeda; supporting Afghan military and police forces; and giving the Afghan people the opportunity to succeed as they stand on their own. The Department of Defense will continue to pursue these objectives as we conclude our combat mission in Afghanistan after 13 years of war. As you know, 2014 has been a year of transition. Afghans turned out in record numbers this spring to elect a new president, though the results of that election remain in doubt. Afghan National Security Forces are now fully in the lead for combat operations as American troops shift to an advisory role. And the United States is preparing to support two new missions: a NATO-led train, advise, and assist mission; and a U.S. counter-terrorism mission against the remnants of al Qaeda.

To support this transition, we will draw down to around 9,800 troops in Afghanistan by the end of 2014, and remain at that level well into 2015. This residual force will focus on training, advising, and assisting Afghan forces and conducting counter-terrorism operations. By

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2016, we will reduce that number by roughly half, consolidating our troops in two locations – Kabul and Bagram Airfield. And by 2017, we will draw down to a substantial security cooperation mission in Kabul, with the potential for continued counter-terrorism operations. Our planning for the post-2014 mission remains contingent on the conclusion of a Bilateral Security Agreement and a NATO Status of Forces Agreement. Both Afghan presidential candidates have confirmed that they will sign both agreements shortly after taking office.

DoD's proposed OCO budget for FY 2015 of \$58.6 billion reflects these developments, as well as U.S. commitments made at the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago. This request is \$26.7 billion or about one third less than the \$85.3 billion enacted by Congress for OCO in the current fiscal year. It is \$100 billion less than the \$159 billion OCO request from just four years ago. While the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan will continue to decline over the course of FY 2015, there are significant costs to provide fully for the needs of our troops in the field and for continued war-related costs that will not decline as quickly as the forces themselves. Our funding request also supports maintaining a sizeable ground, air, and naval force presence in the Middle East region, which is critical to the successful execution of military operations in Afghanistan and other important missions in the region.

The FY 2015 OCO request also supports two new Presidential initiatives: \$5 billion for the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund, of which DoD would receive \$4 billion; and \$1 billion for the European Reassurance Initiative, of which DoD would receive \$925 million. Each of these new initiatives is discussed in more detail below.

Operation Enduring Freedom and Related Missions

The requested funds for FY 2015 will provide \$53.7 billion for OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and related missions. The budget will support the responsible drawdown of forces as announced by the President. It will provide for the continued support of the Afghan National Security Forces and coalition partners. It will pay for needed repairs and replacement of equipment to reset U.S. forces. It will enable the vast range of support activities, including logistics and intelligence. And it will support a portion of the temporary Army and Marine Corps end strength that supports OEF.

The budget request includes:

- \$11 billion for operations and force protection in Afghanistan, including special pays and subsistence, operating tempo, transportation, and supplies;
- \$18.1 billion to carry out the entire array of support activities by units and forces operating in the Central Command area outside of Afghanistan, including air, logistics and intelligence support in the Arabian Gulf region;
- \$9.2 billion for the repair or replacement of equipment, including small sums for equipment still returning after service in Iraq;
- \$4.1 billion for continued support of the ANSF; and
- \$2.4 billion to support the temporary Army and Marine Corps end strength above our base budget levels that is required for support of OEF operations.

Today, we would like to discuss three important parts of this OCO request.

First, our costs in Afghanistan and the greater Middle East region remain substantial. Even with the end of our combat role in Afghanistan, we will continue to provide critical support for our troops and carry out our ongoing counterterrorism mission there, requiring high-end Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets, close air support, force protection,

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and logistics. We also must return thousands of pieces of equipment from Afghanistan to home stations and close down hundreds of combat facilities there. In addition, the FY 2015 OCO request supports other important missions conducted outside Afghanistan, including in the Middle East and Horn of Africa, such as assuring our regional partners, deterring aggression, and working with our partners to counter terrorism. Such support to partners reduces the burden on our forces and is critical to our long-term success.

Second, this OCO request will continue to help our military recover from more than a decade of fighting by covering war-related expenses such as repair and replacement of equipment that has been destroyed or damaged in combat or worn out due to prolonged use. When units return from combat, we restore them to a condition that allows them to conduct training exercises, achieve required readiness levels, and prepare them for future deployments in any potential contingency, from high to low-end conflict. As personnel and equipment return from Afghanistan to their home stations, the need for equipment reset will continue beyond 2015. Accordingly, the OCO request includes \$9.2 billion to fund the repair of major equipment such as tactical vehicles, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles (MRAP), radios, force protection equipment, and replacement of a number of both manned and unmanned aerial vehicles that were lost during operations. It also funds the replenishment of expended munitions, including more than 1,000 tactical missiles such as the Laser Maverick, Hellfire, and other precision stand-off weapons.

Finally, this OCO request provides continued support to the Afghan security forces. We are requesting \$4.1 billion for sustainment, operations, and the continued professionalization of the 352,000 strong ANSF, including 195,000 members of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and 157,000 Afghan National Police (ANP). The request also supports further developing the capacity of the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior to both sustain and command and control their forces.

We should expect the Taliban to continue testing the ANSF. But Afghan forces denied Taliban advances last year, and maintained security over this spring's two rounds of elections. Despite the Taliban's intent to disrupt the election process, the Afghan forces' security operations prevented attacks across the country, and voter turnout was high. During the Taliban's recent offensive in Helmand province, the ANSF organized and executed its operations with little coalition support. In summary, over the last year, the Afghan forces have demonstrated tactical superiority over the Taliban and have prevented the Taliban from gaining momentum. It is critically important that we maintain sufficient financial support to the ANSF so they can sustain those gains and continue to assume full security responsibility across Afghanistan.

Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund

This year's OCO request includes two new initiatives. President Obama announced his plan for the first of these – the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF) – in his commencement address at West Point on May 28. The \$5 billion request for the CTPF includes \$4 billion for the Department of Defense. That funding would support increased partner capacity building, facilitate partner counterterrorism operations, enhance DoD's counterterrorism operations, and increase the Department's flexibility in responding to emerging crises. The funding would also support critical national efforts to contain spillover effects from the ongoing conflict in Syria.

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We are requesting a transfer fund that will provide flexibility for our efforts. It will enable DoD – after appropriate congressional notification – to transfer funds to other accounts for execution, in accordance with national-level priorities and in collaboration with an interagency group that includes the Department of State. We plan to allocate about \$2.5 billion for counterterrorism support and \$1 billion for the Syria Regional Stabilization Initiative, helping Syria’s neighbors – including Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. An additional \$500 million would be allocated for crisis response.

As part of the Syria Regional Stabilization Initiative, we are seeking \$500 million to train and equip appropriately vetted elements of the moderate Syrian armed opposition. This effort represents a critical long-term investment to build Syrian capacity to help secure and stabilize Syria, facilitate the provision of essential services, counter terrorist threats, and promote conditions for a negotiated settlement. It marks another step by this Administration toward helping the Syrian people defend themselves against regime attacks, push back against the growing number of extremists who find safe-haven in the chaos, and take their future into their own hands by enhancing security and stability at local levels.

The overall goal of the CTPF is to increase the ability of partner countries to conduct CT operations within their own borders, prevent the proliferation of terrorist threats from neighboring states, and participate in multinational CT operations to degrade terrorist threats. This support will focus on direct partner support in order to establish and maintain a network of partners to counter the spread of extremist groups. It will also fund transportation and logistical capabilities to address potential “global lift and sustain” gaps of our partners, which could include European and other allies conducting CT operations in these regions, thereby relieving pressure on U.S. forces by enabling partners to assume a greater operational burden.

The Department would use the CTPF to enhance critical capabilities that are in highest demand and that can provide essential support to partner force operations, potentially including:

- Significant increases in ISR funding, including the purchase of secure intelligence dissemination systems for partner-nations; and
- Support for naval CT enablers, such as communications and logistics support at austere locations within the U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility and the Horn of Africa where there are no established base support functions.

The Department would also provide additional funds to cover increased SOF mission costs and the deployment of greater numbers of conventional forces to engage with partner nation forces to combat terrorism. And we would use CTPF funding to increase resources for proven capacity-building programs, such as Section 1206, and partnered CT operations programs, such as Section 1208.

European Reassurance Initiative

The second new initiative – the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) – proposes increases in U.S. military deployments to Europe in the wake of recent developments in Eastern Europe and in Ukraine in particular. We believe that a temporary increase in rotational U.S. air, land, and sea presence in Europe, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, is a necessary and appropriate show of support to our NATO allies and partners who have contributed robustly and bravely to Alliance operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere and who are deeply concerned by Russia’s occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea and other provocative actions in Ukraine. The ERI would be established as a fund that would permit DoD – after appropriate

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notice to Congress – to transfer funds to those initiatives that are deemed to be of the highest priority. The requested amount of \$1 billion includes \$925 million for DoD. It would be available for two years.

Approximately \$440 million will go to increase the U.S. military presence in Europe by:

- Enabling rotation of elements of an Army armored brigade combat team into Europe;
- Providing additional funds for expanded naval deployments in the Black and Baltic Seas;
- Augmenting NATO's Air Policing mission; and
- Either temporarily delaying withdrawal of Air Force F-15C aircraft from Europe or increasing aircraft rotations to Europe.

In addition, ERI will provide about \$75 million for more extensive bilateral and multilateral exercises and training with allies and partners, \$250 million for improvements to infrastructure that will boost responsiveness, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, and \$125 million for enhanced prepositioning of U.S. equipment in Europe. DoD would also use roughly \$35 million to help build partner capacity in some of the newer NATO allies and with non-NATO partners such as Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Providing these countries with the capability and capacity to defend themselves and to enable their participation as full operational partners with NATO is an important complement to other U.S. lines of effort. Boosting the defense capabilities of our partners will also strengthen deterrence against aggressive actions by Russia or from other sources.

Conclusion

To summarize our OCO budget request for FY 2015, we would emphasize that the funds we are requesting will support our troops who are already serving in harm's way in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the CENTCOM area of operations. They will support the President's decision regarding an enduring U.S. presence in Afghanistan. And they will fund two new initiatives that are needed to further our national security objectives in counterterrorism and European reassurance. We ask for your support for this request.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes our statement. We welcome your questions.

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Robert O. Work
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Robert O. Work was confirmed as the 32nd Deputy Secretary of Defense on April 30, 2014.

Mr. Work most recently served as Chief Executive Officer of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). From 2009 to 2013, Mr. Work served as the Undersecretary of the Navy. In this capacity, he was the Deputy and Principal Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy and acted with full authority of the Secretary in the day-to-day management of the Department of the Navy.

In 2008, Mr. Work served on President-elect Barack Obama's Department of Defense Transition Team as leader of the Department of the Navy issues team. He also worked on the defense policy, acquisition, and budget teams.

In 2002, Mr. Work joined the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), first as the Senior Fellow for Maritime Affairs, and later as the Vice President for Strategic Studies. In these positions, he focused on defense strategy and programs, revolutions in war, Department of Defense transformation, and maritime affairs.

Mr. Work was also an adjunct professor at George Washington University, where he taught defense analysis and roles and missions of the armed forces.

Mr. Work was a distinguished graduate of the Naval Reserve Officers Training Course at the University of Illinois, and was commissioned a second lieutenant in the U.S. Marine Corps in August 1974. During his 27-year military career, he held a wide range of command, leadership, and management positions. He commanded an artillery battery and a battalion, and was the base commander at Camp Fuji, Japan. His last assignment was as Military Assistant and Senior Aide to the Honorable Richard Danzig, 71st secretary of the Navy.

Mr. Work earned a Bachelor of Science degree in Biology from the University of Illinois; a Master of Science in Systems Management from the University of Southern California; a Master of Science in Space System Operations from the Naval Postgraduate School; and a Master in International Public Policy from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).

His military and civilian awards include the Legion of Merit, Meritorious Service Medal, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, and the Navy Distinguished Civilian Service Award.



United States Navy Biography

Admiral James A. "Sandy" Winnefeld, Jr. Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Adm. Winnefeld serves as the ninth Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In this capacity, he is a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the nation's second highest-ranking military officer.

Winnefeld graduated from the Georgia Institute of Technology and received his commission through the Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps program. He subsequently served with three fighter squadrons flying the F-14 Tomcat, and as an instructor at the Navy Fighter Weapons School.

Winnefeld's unit commands at sea include Fighter Squadron 211, USS *Cleveland* (LPD 7), and USS *Enterprise* (CVN 65). He led "Big E" through her 18th deployment, which included combat operations in Afghanistan in support of Operation *Enduring Freedom* immediately after the terrorist acts of Sept. 11, 2001. As Commander, Carrier Strike Group Two/Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group, he led Task Forces 50, 152, and 58 in support of Operation *Iraqi Freedom* and maritime interception operations in the Arabian Gulf. He also served as commander, United States 6th Fleet; commander NATO Allied Joint Command, Lisbon; and, commander, Striking and Support Forces NATO.



His shore tours include service in the Joint Staff Operations Directorate (J-3), as senior aide to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and as executive assistant to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations. As a flag officer, he served ashore as director, Warfare Programs and Transformational Concepts, United States Fleet Forces Command; as director of Joint Innovation and Experimentation at United States Joint Forces Command; and, as the director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5) on the Joint Staff. He most recently served as the commander of North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM).

Winnefeld's awards include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star, the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal, the Air Medal, and five Battle Efficiency awards.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

JULY 16, 2014

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS

Ms. TSONGAS. I am concerned that if we continue to fund every new operation with OCO, then we will never be able to end what was meant to be a “temporary” funding stream. Can you explain how DOD plans to transition to solely a base budget?

Secretary WORK. The base budget of the Department provides funds to organize, train, equip, and maintain the full spectrum readiness of the joint force. Other appropriations, such as the current OCO budgets, have historically been used to fund unforeseen operations, activities, contingencies, emergencies, and equipment reset beyond the scope of our normal base budget. As the demand for the use of military force remains high based on increasing global unrest coupled with major decreases in our budgets, the Department will likely continue to need contingency funding in some form of a supplemental for those activities over and above a normal base budget.

Ms. TSONGAS. In the past, DOD has developed weapon systems that are tailored for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. One example of this is the Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN). Funding for BACN is once again contained solely in OCO. Combatant Commanders have stated many times that they want to keep BACN around after operations cease in Afghanistan. What is the plan to fund BACN once OCO funding has been removed? Will it be made a program of record, or will the Combatant Commanders lose another capability?

Secretary WORK. The Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN) is comprised of a fleet of EQ-4B and E-11A airframes and operations are exclusively funded with Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) resources. At this time, BACN is not a base-funded program of record and the Department intends to divest the EQ-4B and E-11A fleets if OCO funding is not available. Air Combat Command has evaluated options to create an E-11A BACN program of record, post conflict; however, sufficient funding is unavailable.

Ms. TSONGAS. I am concerned that if we continue to fund every new operation with OCO, then we will never be able to end what was meant to be a “temporary” funding stream. Can you explain how DOD plans to transition to solely a base budget?

Admiral WINNEFELD. The base budget of the Department provides funds to organize, train, equip, and maintain the full spectrum readiness of the joint force. Supplemental appropriations, such as the current OCO budgets, have historically been used to fund unforeseen operations, activities, contingencies, emergencies, and equipment reset beyond the scope of our normal base budget. We believe this is most logical and efficient way to fund these types of operations and activities because to properly anticipate them in the base budget could result in programmed funds that are never used if such contingencies do not arise. As the demand for the use of military force remains high coupled with major decreases in our defense base budgets, the Department will likely continue to need contingency funding in some form of a supplemental for those activities over and above a normal base budget.

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER

Mr. SHUSTER. There are some people that believe the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) should cease to exist as the war in Afghanistan comes to a close. Others feel that JIEDDO should remain because the IED problem continues to grow worldwide and the IED is an ever-growing and ever-existing threat. What factors were looked at to draw the conclusion of reducing JIEDDO's personnel by 3,000 and their funds by 60 percent? What impact will this have to available capabilities to the combatant commanders?

Secretary WORK. The Department of Defense (DOD) recognizes the importance of transitioning the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to an enduring joint organization. While maintaining key capabilities for support to Combatant Commands, the Department made the decision to reduce the size and budget for JIEDDO based on change of mission and downsizing in Afghanistan, and in response to the fiscal pressures on DOD. The decision was made to reduce JIEDDO to 975 personnel in Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 and transition to a base capacity by FY 2017. The President's Budget (PB) for FY 2015 includes the base budget necessary for 400 personnel and additional resources are provided through Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) appropriations. The reduction of JIEDDO personnel and reduction of its funding was reviewed, in part, through the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DSD) Deputy's Management Action Group (DMAG) process with reviews by the DSD conducted March 30, 2012, July 3, 2012, and July 17, 2013. At the July 2013, DMAG, the DSD made the decision to transition the essential capabilities of JIEDDO to an integrated joint organization based on the following factors that enable tactical responsiveness and anticipatory acquisition to prepare for and react to battlefield surprise in counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, and other related mission areas to include counter-IED.

In preparation for the 2013 DMAG, the staffing level of JIEDDO at the beginning of a two year transition period was determined by the Director, JIEDDO, presented at the DMAG, and approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. In November 2013, the DSD clarified direction to ensure that JIEDDO, as it transitions, sustains its counter-IED capability in support of U.S. forces while operations in Afghanistan continue. The Department's processes to determine and request OCO funds were used for additional FY 2015 funding for JIEDDO, as it transitions, to continue the counter-IED support of U.S. forces while operations in Afghanistan and other areas around the world continue. The additional OCO funding of \$379 million is for support that is beyond the capability that would be available if the funding were to be limited to the 400 personnel supported through the PB 2015 request. This will enable JIEDDO to adequately support the counter-IED requirements of the Combatant Commanders, with some limitations. Going forward, within the capacity of the projected base budget funding for 400 personnel and, to the extent that OCO funds are requested and appropriate, the integrated joint organization support, including counter IED efforts, to Combatant Commanders would continue at congressionally approved levels.

Mr. SHUSTER. The Department of Defense and the State Department have \$1.5 billion that could be used for the Syrian Regional Stabilization Initiative. What will the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund provide to support partners' counterterrorism efforts in the Middle East and Africa? How much does the United States currently spend on counterterrorism in those regions, and to what effect?

Secretary WORK. A portion of the amount requested for the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund (CTPF) is intended to be used to build the operational and institutional capacity of partner nations to conduct counterterrorism operations. It is envisioned that these programs will be conducted using existing building partner capacity (BPC) authorities such as section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2006, as amended, section 1207 of the NDAA for

FY 2012 (“Global Security Contingency Fund” or “GSCF”), as amended, and the Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA) global authority granted in the FY 2012 NDAA; or operational authorities such as Section 1208 of the NDAA for FY 2005 (Public Law 108–375), as amended. Examples of programs conducted under those authorities could include:

- Enhance partner border, maritime security and expeditionary operations capacity;
- Enhance partner logistical capabilities, including transportation and engineering capabilities;
- Enhance partner defense institutions, including in areas such as resource management, logistics and maintenance, and planning; and
- Provide support to partner forces engaged in supporting or facilitating ongoing military operations by U.S. special operations forces (SOF) to combat terrorism.

In FY 2014 DOD is undertaking, or expects to undertake, the following counterterrorism programs:

1) Under the authority granted in Section 1208 of the NDAA for FY 2005 (Public Law 108–375), as amended, DOD expects to spend \$28.5M for partners’ support of counterterrorism efforts in the Middle East and Africa. These funds are used to provide support to partner forces who are engaged in supporting or facilitating ongoing military operations by U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) to combat terrorism.

2) Under the authority granted in Section 1207 of the NDAA for FY 2012 (Public Law 112–81), as amended, DOD and the State Department expect to spend \$7.75M to train and equip Libyan special operations forces to counter violent extremist organizations and better secure Libya’s borders against the illicit flow of weapons and foreign fighters. The State Department and DOD are also working to redesign a \$14.89M GSCF program to improve Libyan border security adapted to accommodate the degraded political and security situation in Libya. Finally, DOD and the State Department recently notified a \$40M GSCF program of assistance for Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria intended to counter Boko Haram.

3) Under the authority granted in Section 1206 of the NDAA for FY 2006 (Public Law 109–63), as amended, DOD expects to spend \$191.07M to build the capacity of national military forces, maritime security forces, and/or security forces in Middle East and African nations to conduct counterterrorism operations in FY 2014. As of 16 September 2014, DOD has notified, but Congress has not approved, an additional \$4.6M for Tunisia. These figures do not include costs associated with transportation, pre-shipment consolidation, or human rights vetting and training.

4) Under the authority granted in Section 2011 of Title X, United States Code, DOD expects to spend \$19.4M in support of enhancing U.S. SOF capability in foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare by training with partner nation forces in the Middle East and Africa. Although these funds are not explicitly used for training partner nations in counter-terrorism, the mission-essential tasks that U.S. SOF and partner nations use for interoperability training may be subsequently used to execute counter-terrorism missions.

5) Under the authority granted in Section 2249c of Title X, United States Code, DOD expects to spend \$14.9M for partner nations in the Middle East and Africa in support of targeted, non-lethal, combating terrorism education and training for mid- to senior-level international military officers, ministry of defense civilians, and security officials. These programs are designed to address key CbT challenges within partner nations through a tailored program of activities to meet specific Combatant Command objectives.

6) Under the authority granted in Section 1203(d) (1) of the NDAA for FY 2012 (Public Law 112–239), DOD expects to spend \$75M in FY 2014 to enhance the capacity of the national military forces of Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Uganda participating in the African Union Mission in Somalia to conduct counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda, al Qaeda affiliates, and al Shabaab.

7) Under the authority granted in Section 1022 of the NDAA for FY2004 (Public Law 108–136), as amended, DOD expects to spend \$2.8M in support of law enforcement to identify and disrupt terrorist financial flows, and to implement BPC activities.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN

Mr. COFFMAN. Looking at the President’s OCO request, of the \$4 billion requested for the Syria Regional Stabilization Initiative, \$500 million has been “vetted for elements of the Syrian opposition.” How has the Administration identified what groups qualify as an “opposition element”?

Secretary WORK. The moderate Syrian opposition is not a monolithic group. The moderate Syrian opposition consists of a variety of groups, such as the Free Syrian Army, as well as other groups and individuals that also would undergo a deliberate vetting process. We anticipate that the train-and-equip program, which would be funded by the requested \$500 million, will attract moderate opposition forces currently engaged in combat operations, but also volunteers that have not yet affiliated with a specific element of the moderate opposition.

Mr. COFFMAN. Can you explain why the percentage of reduction for the OCO request from FY14 to FY15 (27.7%) was not more proportional to the percentage of troop reduction in Afghanistan for FY15 (74.7%)?

Secretary WORK. The Department's Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) request supports direct and indirect costs associated with combat operations within Afghanistan. Although the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan will decline over the course of FY 2015, some war-related support costs will not decline as quickly as the forces themselves. In addition to providing combat support activities, the OCO request also supports In-Theater Support Activities (to include Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), Afghan Security Forces training and equipping, Coalition Support, and costs associated with returning the Military Services to the United States and retrograding their equipment.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KILMER

Mr. KILMER. I understand that the Navy has assumed a liability of approximately \$3 billion related to overseas contingency operations and that some 89 ships require dry-docking maintenance availabilities to correct the backlog of maintenance accrued during 1999 and 2009. If you could please describe the actions the Department has taken to ensure an appropriate level of staff and equipment at our public shipyards to conduct these resets. Additionally, please describe what actions the Department has taken to ensure that the private sector is ready to handle this increased level of effort.

Secretary WORK. The Navy estimates that the backlog of maintenance on its ships will take approximately \$1.3 billion over the Future Years Defense Program to correct. This backlog is specifically on surface ships, which conduct the majority of their depot-level maintenance availabilities in the private sector. As a result, there is no projected impact on the public shipyards.

The impact to the private sector is minimized by conducting reset work during normally scheduled availabilities. Navy conducts detailed pre-availability inspections in an effort to accurately scope the work as early as possible. This helps the Navy and industry plan for the necessary manpower and resources to execute the desired workload.

Mr. KILMER. As I am sure you are aware, this committee has taken a keen interest in the acquisition process and activities of the Department of Defense. Looking at the OCO budget, I am interested in understanding how much of the requested funds would be used for the acquisition of services not related to the maintenance and or restoration of combat equipment that was destroyed, damaged, stressed, or worn out beyond economic repair and how this differs from the FY 14 request? I am concerned with the stability of ongoing service contracts that are paid for with OCO funds.

Secretary McCORD. The FY 2015 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) request includes approximately \$4.0 billion in contract services not related to the maintenance and repair of combat equipment. This represents a decrease of \$4.6 billion from the FY 2014 enacted levels. The majority of these costs support ongoing in-theater and CONUS operations providing contractor logistic support and base operations/facilities support. These contract services numbers do not include contracts in Afghanistan as these costs will continue to decline, and will not be enduring as the number of deployed service members continue to decrease.